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Getting Migrant Labour Policies Right for Citizens: A Comparative Study of France, Canada, 
Singapore and Dubai. 
Amidst pessimistic economic outlook faced by many developed countries and the resulting effects on 
unemployment, it is apt to relook at a stalwart of globalization: that of labour moving across borders 
flocking to countries where better economic prospects can be achieved. Citizens often blame migrant 
labour policies for their inability to earn a living and for alterations to their way of life and national 
identity. Faced with increasing opposition to migrant labour, which is sometimes fuelled with extreme 
right rhetoric from opposing political actors, governments need to get migrant labour policies right so 
that they would stay in power.  
I examine four cases using the case study method to answer my main research question: why 
are migrant labour policies negatively perceived by citizens? I used secondary information 
extensively, drawing from works by other academics and media articles. Four hypotheses were 
developed after reviewing the literature and the information from the cases was used to test them. The 
cases (France, Canada, Singapore and Dubai) were first studied longitudinally and then compared. 
I show that citizens would support migrant labour policies when the latter are not perceived to 
have negative effects on their economic well-being and national identity. Governments would fare 
better with these policies if they can counter extreme right rhetoric from opposing political actors who 
scapegoat migrants for citizens’ woes. The perception of too many migrants results in the rejection of 
migrant labour policies seeking to admit more foreigners. I also show that support for migrant labour 
policies would suffer when the economy is not performing well. The importance of the perception of 
citizens is highlighted as what governments need to be able to master so as to achieve support for 
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Citizens expect their governments to champion policies that promote their well-being. Very often, the 
performance of a government is measured by how popular these policies are. In democracies, the 
failure of governments to meet the expectations of their citizens usually results in them being 
punished by losing elections. Therefore, there is much motivation for governments to get policies 
right in the eyes of their citizens. 
In this thesis, I examine the reaction of citizens to migrant labour policies formulated and 
implemented by their governments. The decision to import labour almost always derives from the 
desire to bring economic prosperity to the country. However, migrant labour comes at a political price 
if the government is not able to balance the admission of foreigners with the expectations of citizens. I 
seek to provide responses to the question: why are migrant labour policies negatively perceived by 
citizens? This question narrows the study by focusing on migrant labour policies and the support they 
garner from citizens. I postulate that governments are successful when they formulate policies that 
citizens do not perceive as contrary to their self-interest. The latter normally takes many forms; I 
concentrate on the economic and national identity aspects. 
 The qualms of citizens who feel disadvantaged by migrant labour policies are further 
accentuated by political actors with extreme right agendas who prey on their insecurity to further 
political goals. They champion an agenda of estrangement against migrant labour which they 
scapegoat as the source of economic woes and erosion of national identity and culture. They rally the 
support of the average citizen who joins for patriotic reasons. Through the astute use of issue framing, 
extreme right parties are able to garner support against migration policies. I argue that in order for a 
government to be successful at mustering acceptance of foreign labour, it has to outplay actors with 
extreme right agenda at framing issues. 
 I further posit that a government will gather less support for its migrant labour policies when 
the economy is struggling. This is a natural extension to my main theses and it is essential because it 
adds a situational element to the theory and therefore enhances its explanatory value.  
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Finally, I show that citizens’ support of migrant labour policies is inversely correlated to their 
perception of the size of the migrant labour population. Although the number of migrant workers may 
not be as large as citizens perceive, their perception triggers a sense of overcrowding that motivates 
their opposition to the government admitting more foreign labour. In some cases, the perception may 
be justified because the migrant labour population is indeed substantial. 
The current topic has grown in pertinence today because of the on-going economic calamity 
that various parts of the world face and that have challenged one of the pillars of globalization: the 
ability not only for capital to move freely across borders but also for people to migrate in their search 
of better prospects. The long-held economic rhetoric used by politicians to explain the importation of 
labour, which is also latched on low fertility rates in most developed countries, is being subjected to 
challenge as citizens question whether migrant labour policies benefit them. This in turn brings into 
focus the very essence of representation whereby policies are supposed to promote the interest of the 
people instead of a select few capitalists.  
I offer my answers to these important debates as a humble contribution to the vast body of 
works that already exists.  I add to the academic literature that examines perception, or the art of 
manipulating the way the citizenry sees events or society for political gain, by demonstrating that 
perception (versus realities/facts) is the driver for the acceptance or rejection of migrant labour 
policies. The thrust of my thesis is that it does not really matter whether there are too many migrants 
or those migrants are impacting the interest of locals in reality. As long as locals perceive them 
negatively, migrant labour policies will not be supported.  
In order to steer the reader towards the perspective that I choose to present in this thesis, I find 
it important to state upfront that I do not adopt a humanistic approach in my analysis of the success of 
migration policy. Others have chosen to do so (I present some literature on that in the next chapter). 
My focus is not motivated a lack of sensitivity or compassion to the miseries that migrant labour 
policy failures inflict on citizens and migrants. I attempt not to repeat what has been written on at 
great lengths. Instead, I delve into how citizens perceive migrant labour policies and their explicit 
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reactions to them. Humanistic consequences will be brought up sparsely and where relevant. My 
approach further focuses my endeavour and allows me to keep to the space allocated to develop my 
ideas comprehensively. 
 In the next chapter, I conduct a review of the literature. I develop a theoretical framework and 
develop four hypotheses, which are tested with information from four case studies. In Chapter 3, I 
elaborate on the research design and explain why I believe the case study method is preferable for this 
thesis. I also justify the examination of four cases: France, Canada, Singapore and Dubai, which will 
be compared longitudinally and in pairs. Chapters 4 to 7 present the case studies with particular focus 
on whether and how they verify my hypotheses. I conclude and suggest areas for future research in 
















This chapter formulates a theoretical framework for citizens’ support of government policies in 
general. The literature on citizens’ support of migrant labour policies is surveyed and where relevant, 
findings are synthesized in a bid to form a coherent image of migrant labour as an issue, explaining 
why migrant workers face animosity from locals and how governments deal with the issue of 
immigration. I find political economy a particularly apt way of presenting my findings. I will also 
integrate voting theories such as the proximity voting developed by Downs and the directional voting 
theory posited by Rabinowitz and MacDonald. In addition, I delve in the influence of rightist political 
actors in focussing support against migrant labour policies. I finally touch on why governments 
should be accountable for migrant labour policies. 
In attempting to gain support for policies, politicians manipulate the political field using what 
has been termed as “heresthetics” by William Riker (Riker 1986). While rightist political actors 
usually use rhetoric to win the votes of the electorate, both themselves and their rivals also attempt to 
alter the field through various machinations designed to boost their advantage.  
 As I review existing information in the current field of interest, I develop four hypotheses that 
subsequent information can be applied to provide answers to the research question: why are migrant 
labour policies negatively perceived by citizens?  
SUPPORT FOR GOVERNMENT POLICIES 
Public opinion drives citizens’ attitude towards government policies. The literature points to two main 
causes of public attitude towards government policy: self-interest and symbolic politics. The basic 
premise of the first is that individuals will form their opinions about a policy based on what they stand 
to benefit from it or how much the opposite of the policy will affect or benefit them (Sears et al. 1980: 
671). This means that people often make decisions that increase their wealth, power or prestige. The 
self-interest theory relies on two principles: i) the benefit derived from a policy decision must be 
direct and tangible, and ii) those affected by the policy outcome receive the greatest benefits or pay 
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the highest costs (Lau et al. 1978: 466). Therefore, because they stand to benefit or lose the most, 
those who are affected by a policy decision tend to hold the strongest opinion about the policy.  
The second main cause of support for government policies is termed ‘symbolic politics’ and 
depends on the process of socialization individuals have gone through earlier in life. Henderson et al. 
(1995: 37) identify three principles of this theory: i) in general preferences held by individuals result 
from childhood socialization and continue throughout adulthood, ii) attitudes are paired with positive 
and negative symbolic associations whereby later in life individuals would associate a policy with a 
certain symbol that resembles attitudes formed earlier, and iii) attitudes formed as a result of 
preconditioning may supersede a rational assessment of personal need or personal satisfaction.   
 According to the symbolic politics theory, someone’s interest does not necessarily need to be 
affected before he expresses opposition to a policy. Instead, his sentiments about a policy depend on 
the socialization process he has gone through (Henderson et al. 1995: 37). If the policy evokes a 
negative symbol formed earlier in life, he will oppose the policy. For example, if he has been 
socialized to think that coloured people are predisposed to violence, he will oppose a community 
integration policy that encourages coloured people to move into his neighbourhood. An individual’s 
final decision on whether to support a policy may not be rational in that it furthers his interests. A 
decision is made based on a preconception that is triggered by the policy. Another aspect of the 
decision is that it may not be based on accurate information. Later in this chapter, I will elaborate 
upon a theory about decisions of voters that presupposes that they do not and cannot have perfect 
information. In fact, the information available is superficial. Therefore, it is held that most voters 
cannot make rational decisions but usually make the decision that they feel is right. 
 These two theories imply that the government’s task of formulating policies can be tedious. A 
policy may incite the opposition of a segment of the population because it does not benefit from it. 





Retrospective and Prospectively Voting 
In democratic systems, the final test of policies by parties in power is elections. The literature has 
identified two ways in which people vote: retrospectively and prospectively. In the former, voters 
tally the track record of the government and decide whether to vote it back in power or give it support 
on a certain issue (Lanoue 1994: 203). If the government’s policy of importing labour has generally 
increased the utility of the people and they evaluate it as such, they would vote positively for that 
government on migrant labour policies.  
 If voters vote prospectively, they base their choice on how they expect the situation to be in 
the future. If their expectation is other than what the current government proposes, they will vote 
against it and for another party that promulgates policies that are in line with what voters see as a 
better direction (Lanoue 1994: 193). If voters view that the government has been allowing too many 
migrant workers and has not taken concrete steps, despite feedback, to make policy changes, chances 
are that the government will not do that well in the next elections on the migrant labour issue if 
another party is proposing wide cuts to migrant labour admissions. 
 There has been much debate about which voting behaviour voters use in various 
circumstances and different cases. I do not propose to contribute to that debate. However, it is 
important to be aware of these two voting patterns insofar as they will help us understand certain 
aspects of the cases that are dealt with later in this thesis.  
SELF-INTEREST - POLITICAL ECONOMY 
The political economy model can be used to examine the three main aspects of the economic life of 
the citizen that result in him not supporting the government’s migrant labour policy: jobs, wages and 
welfare. These economic elements are studied through a political science perspective. They represent 
the elements of self-interest that are presumably at stake when the government decides to admit 
migrant labour. First, an image of the migrant worker in the context of the political economic model is 
constructed. The image is completed by adding the relationship between migrant labour and other 
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relevant actors such as the government, capitalists and citizens. I then draw from Down’s theory of 
proximity voting to show how personal economic considerations may impact the decision of the voter 
to support the incumbent government or seek policy change by voting for another political party. I 
proceed to review the literature regarding each of the three aspects, how they result in citizens not 
supporting the government’s migrant labour policies and some findings by scholars. Finally, I expand 
on the findings by drawing from the literature about other dynamics such as the family reunification 
programs and illegal migration to enrich the discourse and highlight its complexity.  
Through the political economy model, the migrant worker is seen as a factor of production 
(Freeman 2005: 117). He is sought after by capitalists in the receiving country because of a gap in the 
supply of labour. The gap may be due to low supply of cheap labour or shortage of specialized labour. 
Another reason is scarcity of labour for jobs that are not deemed desirable by locals. There may not be 
equilibrium between the supply and demand for labour because of imperfections in the system that 
assesses how much labour is needed and how much migrant labour is to be admitted.  
It is very often perceived by locals that there are too many migrants (Sides and Citrin 2007: 
500). This creates tension between capitalists who clamour for more labour to drive costs down or fill 
positions and locals who see more foreign labour as more competition for jobs, wages and welfare. 
Capitalists expect the government to provide a climate conducive to doing business. Citizens 
generally expect the government to ensure that they have employment, make a decent living through 
reasonable wages and enjoy welfare when they require it. 
 Because it is easier to organize small groups, capitalists are at an advantage as far as lobbying 
is concerned (Money 1999: 32, Olson 1965: 143). It is relatively easy for them to group and 
effectively lobby the government to pass laws that welcome to migrant workers. They can also push 
for a certain type of migrants. It is more difficult to organize the masses unless there are activist 
groups and political parties that target immigrants and seek to influence immigration policies. Those 
are motivated by ideology or power instead of economic profit. Therefore, in liberal democracies, 
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migrant labour policy is about the interaction of three broad groups of players: government, capitalists 
and citizens (as organized by activists and politicians). 
 While the government can be pro-capital and therefore relax entry requirements for migrants, 
it also has to ensure that citizens are content so that it will not lose power. Satisfying the demand for 
more labour can translate into donations for political campaigns and various endorsements from 
capitalists. Since the government also has a stake in ensuring that the economy performs, it may be 
swayed towards answering the calls of capitalists for more labour to boost the economy. 
 Labour cannot be taken as a whole. Based on economic factors alone, insofar as people do not 
feel that their jobs are threatened by migrants, they would presumably not complain. If those allowed 
in are crowding a certain sector and substituting locals, they would not be welcome (Cohen 2001: 
138). However, if they are not competing for the jobs and are instead taking up jobs that locals are 
reluctant to perform or lack the expertise or qualifications to carry out, they may be tolerated. 
 The solution would seem evident: in order to increase support for migrant labour policies, the 
government should admit migrant workers that will carry out jobs that locals are not willing to 
perform or not capable of taking up. This assumes that a perfect coordination between supply and 
demand is possible. However, it is almost never the case. Even in sectors where locals can and are 
willing to take up jobs, there is sometimes a shortage of manpower and migrant labour is imported to 
fill excess positions. Sometimes, even though there is almost a balance, locals perceive that there is a 
crowding problem and this causes resentment. As elaborated later, the balance is further upset by 
illegal immigration and various parties’ appeal for the right of past immigrants to reunite with their 





Spatial Theory of Voting
1
 
In formulating his spatial theory of voting, Downs states that it is logical that the citizen will vote the 
party whose policies improve his utility (Downs 1957: 36). Downs premises his theory on the rational 
voter. The utility is not limited to material benefits but also ideological ones thus paving the way for 
altruistic expressions that citizens think are important. The citizen assesses how a particular party has 
done over time and observes the trend on which he will base his voting decision. For instance, if a 
party is known to implement a policy over a period of time, the voter would assume that it will 
continue doing so unless there is a shift in direction which the party will make known during the 
electoral campaign. 
 Downs recognizes that this method of decision-making is fraught with uncertainty because 
the party may end up not implementing the policy as promised resulting in a loss in utility for the 
citizen (1957: 39). The track record of the party would mitigate this risk for the citizen since if the 
party has stayed faithful to the policy for a number of years, there is no reason to assume that it would 
suddenly break from it. 
 Another issue is that since no citizen has access to perfect information about policies, not 
many fully understand the implications of policies and therefore can make a truly rational decision. 
Downs mentions that the more information that is available to the voter the more likely it could make 
him change his position (1957: 47). Therefore, it is the role of political parties to provide as much 
information as possible so that voters will vote for them. The importance of information can be 
readily seen through parties who have political meetings, rallies and debates to educate voters on their 
own policies and discredit the proposed policies of other parties. This is a very common sight during 
most democratic elections. The same power of information also means that those who wish to 
manipulate the information for political gain by educating voters using twisted illustrations and 
theories, probably could make much ground in terms of winning votes.  
                                                          
1
 In this section, I concentrate on Downs’ theory regarding the way citizens vote. This is only a small section of 
his economic theory of democracy. Since we are concerned with citizens’ reaction to government policies that 
will transpire through them expressing their opinion during the elections, the chosen section is enough to drive 
the current discourse forward. 
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 Fully aware that the field may not always be limited to two parties or that there may not be 
two separate sets of policies and that policies may not appeal to a critical number of voters while still 
being preferred by some, Downs further expounds on his theory and observes that the voter will vote 
for the most preferred alternative if his preferred choice stands no chance of being voted (1957: 48). 
This is very much in line with the rational voter trying to benefit as much as possible by throwing his 
vote with the party that seems more likely to win and whose policies, even though not the same as his, 
are similar. The alternative would be for the voter to stick to a losing party and let the party 
championing the opposite of his preferred policy win. 
 However, the voter may support a hopeless party in the hope that the party will grow and be a 
serious contender or be a strong opposition in future. He terms this as “future-oriented voting” (1957: 
49). Alternatively, he may vote for a party thus sending a signal to other parties that they should give 
a set of policies a second thought since not doing so would lose them votes.  
 Downs’ theory is important because it predicts that the citizens will try to maximize his utility 
by voting a party in power that formulates policies that are compatible with his self-interest. In the 
case of migrant labour policies, the following sections will expound on the interests that the citizens 
see as being threatened by the government admitting migrants. Downs’ theory will also be used later 
in this thesis to try to make sense of seemingly strange electorate behaviour in supporting parties that 
are strong, which have a moderate agenda and do not go as far as others would in pushing the anti-
migrant labour stand. 
Jobs and Wages 
How a country benefits in terms of domestic factors of production, especially labour, will be key in 
determining a country’s migrant labour policy. Where migrants and locals are substitutes there will be 
more lobbying for protection of jobs for locals. This is because the relative earnings of local 
capitalists will rise, while those of domestic labour will fall, leading to greater incentives for local 
labour organizations to lobby for immigration restriction whereas capitalists have none.  
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One reason why capitalists import labour is to benefit from the lower cost of imported labour. 
Since imported labour is cheaper, it could also be assumed that in order for locals to compete in the 
labour market, they have to accept lower salaries. It follows that immigrants depress remuneration. 
Scholars have proved the opposite. For instance, David Card (2010: 441) finds that wages in all skill 
groups are higher in high immigrant cities. Natives tend to earn more within any selected skill group. 
This means that there is an imperfect substitution between natives and immigrants for same skill 
positions. Card concludes that immigrants often suffer from lower pay as compared to natives whose 
pay seem to be unaffected by high inflow of migrant labour. 
There is fierce debate on whether immigrants will take up the jobs of locals. In an article 
based on US data, Card (2005: 313) finds little evidence to support the position that immigration 
disadvantages less skilled natives economically. This is because industries that rely on low skilled 
workers are located in cities where there are relatively more low skilled immigrants. Therefore, there 
is little competition especially since migrants tend to be less well educated than low skilled locals.  
Card (2010) also uses 2000 US Census data to further his claim that immigrants are not 
responsible for native’s loss of jobs and do not depress wages. He observes that high immigrant cities 
have more workers in the lowest skill quartile. The influx of immigrants does not result in a 
significant displacement of natives. This finding is echoed by Money (1999: 52). This could mean that 
the locals do not see a need to move elsewhere as a result of immigrants settling in probably because 
they do not feel disadvantaged when trying to earn a living. However, it could also be due to other 
reasons such as citizens generally have a sense of attachment to the place where they are living, their 
current location is where their support network (relatives, friends etc.) is, they lack the means to move 
elsewhere or that they are simply afraid of the unknown elsewhere.  
In general, economic migrants to the US are less skilled than natives. High immigration 
polarizes the workforce towards a higher share of low skilled workers as compared to the national 
average. While this is observed in most high immigration cities and on average for the whole of the 
US, the landscape is not homogenous. Some cities tend to attract higher skilled immigrants. 
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 Regardless of the findings of scholars such as Card and Money on whether immigrants bring 
along competition for jobs and depress wages, we are interested in the perception of people and their 
reaction. The fact that scholars have found the need to debunk the perception that migrant workers 
compete for jobs and depress wages is telling on the perception being widespread.  
Welfare 
One of the most important reasons why locals do not support immigration is the perception that 
immigrants saddle the welfare system by benefitting more than they contribute. Even though this 
thesis deals with a specific group of immigrants - those who travel across borders to seek jobs - it 
makes more sense here to examine the literature dealing with immigrants who migrated for economic 
reasons and settled down in their host countries. The rest of this section will elaborate on the reasons 
why this approach is more fruitful when dealing with welfare. 
Lee and Miller (1998) examine how immigrants affect expenditure and revenue collection in 
the United States. They criticize the way this information is usually presented and champion their own 
approach. They introduce a new model that they argue best represents the reality of immigrant 
contribution and fiscal cost. It is premised on the fact that without first-generation immigrants, 
descendants would not be present. Descendants should therefore be counted even when they stop 
living with their parents as long as their parents are still living (else in the case of America where 
most are descendants of immigrants, the study would have to cover most of the population). This 
model yields positive results because after incurring much expenditure through public education, the 
descendants join the workforce and start contributing, thus resulting in net contribution through taxes. 
 Other studies are usually divided into two groups: i) examining fiscal impact of immigrants 
themselves, and ii) tallying the figures for immigrants and their descendants who still live with them. 
When the March Current Population Survey conducted in 1994 and 1995 is applied to each model, it 
is found that the first will yield a positive result: immigrants contribute more than what is spent on 
them. This is because immigrants are usually at the peak of their contribution years: young adults in 
the workforce (Lee and Miller 1998: 197). 
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 When the same data is applied to the second model, it yields negative results. This is because 
dependents who are still living with immigrants are costly primarily because of public education. This 
tips the balance to net expenditure. The authors observe that this is the main way of reporting the 
effect of immigrants on the fiscal system and probably explains why most people are under the 
impression that immigrants do not contribute as much as the government spends on them (Lee and 
Miller 1998: 198). As elaborated later in this chapter anti-immigration advocates use these figures to 
foster animosity towards migrant labour policies. The presentation of the data in a way to sway the 
audience into thinking a certain way is a good example of issue framing. In this case, the application 
of different methods of calculating the net impact of economic migrants on the welfare system results 
in contradicting results. The least favourable results can be used to drive an anti-migrant labour 
agenda backed by statistics which unsuspecting citizens may blindly believe. 
Against Family Reunification 
Scholars have observed that a large number of immigrants are admitted for family reunification. 
While it can be argued that it is the right of relatives to be reunited, an important problem is that many 
are allowed to settle down do not bring with them skills that the country needs. I have already 
discussed the welfare system earlier and scholars have determined that immigration does not lead to 
an unfavourable contribution to use ratio. Nonetheless, family reunification is sometimes seen as a 
waste of visas that could be allotted to those who make a real contribution to the economy and 
promote job creation (West 2010: 126). 
 West (2010: 133-154) lists a number of ways to control the influx of immigrants such that 
only talented individuals, mostly in the science and technology fields, would be admitted. For 
instance, relatives could be defined narrowly to mean immediate family so that the family 
reunification criterion will not be allocated the most numbers of visas. Similar to Australia and 
Canada, a point system could be introduced so that those who have the capacity or potential to 
contribute would be more likely to be admitted. His recommendations lean heavily towards policies 
aimed at attracting economically active migrants who can also make an intellectual contribution to the 
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US. His views echo that of a segment of the population that support migrant labour or immigration 
insofar as it results in a net gain for locals. This can be realized through additional employment and 
better wages generated through entrepreneurship or an easier life whereby migrant labour serves the 
local population which can then concentrate on enhancing its economic gains. 
 There is tension between a seemingly illogical aspect of immigration, admitting immigrants 
for family reunification, and that of the more logical and economic aspect of admission based on 
economic needs. It is difficult for governments to control the influx of immigrants such that only 
those who are needed and who would not make the locals upset are admitted. Past migrants 
demanding that their right to bring over their relatives makes the government’s task more tedious. 
Illegal Migration 
Illegal immigration is a massive problem. The government has more control over the 
economic variables if it is able to control its borders. Being able to control who is admitted allows the 
government to carefully plan and balance the demand for labour, requests for admission and the 
expectations and sentiments of the population (Ethier 1986: 70). If the government has border control 
problems, the balance may break down leading to an overflow of illegal immigrants or the perception 
that there are too many immigrants. 
Illegal immigrants therefore add another variable to the calculations of governments and since 
they cannot be accounted for accurately, they can lead to miscalculations on the part of the 
government. The anger of locals against migrants who presumably take up their jobs and depress their 
wages may be escalated because those migrants were not legally admitted by the government and 
were not accounted for in planning labour for various economic sectors. The anger would be targeted 
towards the government for failing to protect the borders.  
The illegal immigration problem can run deeper when enforcement of anti-illegal immigration 
laws affects minorities who are mistaken for illegal immigrants (De Laet 2006: 73). Sometimes, 
minorities face brutality and intimidation because they are confused with illegal immigrants. This 
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leads to further anger from members of these minorities who, even though they are legal citizens of 
the country, are not treated as such and are denied their citizenship privileges. 
 This chapter so far yields the following hypothesis: 
H1: A government will obtain support from citizens for migrant labour policies when they are not 
perceived by citizens as affecting their economic interests. 
SYMBOLIC POLITICS 
Directional Theory of Voting 
Rabinowitz and MacDonald (1989) are not satisfied that voters are motivated only by self-interest and 
seek to maximize their utility when voting. Voters receive low levels of information, which diffuses 
their sense of direction with regards to policies. They hold varying intensity views in their preferences 
for issues. Given the diffuse information that they receive, voters cannot possibly be rational. This 
theory is based on symbolic politics, which in a nutshell implies that people form preferences based 
on the way they have been socialized and their past experiences (Henderson et al. 1995: 37). 
 Politicians are able to win elections if the electorate leans towards two extremes within the 
region of acceptability
2
. Beyond that region, few voters will follow the politician because they would 
consider the latter to be too extreme. If parties hold more or less the same views on an issue, they will 
not be able to skew the votes towards their direction. Politicians who are most aggressive in their 
opinions, and yet are not extreme enough to fall outside the region of acceptability, will draw people 
who already share the same opinion including those who are in the middle. The closer the politician is 
to the region of acceptability, the more attractive he will be to voters (Rabinowitz and McDonald 
1989: 109). This politician will also have an advantage on politicians at the centre. This theory is 
important for politicians who want to earn votes by focussing on issues that people feel strongly 
                                                          
2
 If politicians are too extreme, voters will not likely vote for them in large numbers. The acceptability region as 
described by Rabinowitz and MacDonald refers to a diagrammatical representation of how extreme politicians 
are about an issue.  
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about. Migration is one of those and rightist political actors’ results could probably be explained to 
some extent with this theory. 
 In application and to state the obvious, politicians who want to be successful should be able to 
read trends within the electorate. They will the n be able to take advantage of the sentiments of the 
masses by adopting those sentiments, refining them and being more intense about them than that 
portion of the electorate. The authors caution that if the electorate is split into two and if politicians 
champion each side, the effect will cancel out and neither group will benefit in terms of votes.  
Group Identity and Political Ideology 
The past two decades have seen a rise in the subscription to the extreme right political stand. This is 
especially noticed in Europe where radical right parties have managed to garner much support and 
bolstered their political standing (Guibernau 2010: 4). Many scholars have argued that these parties 
obtain their newfound support from citizens who are disillusioned by the policies of mainstream 
political parties mainly over immigration (Guibernau 2010: 11, Givens 2002: 138). These parties prey 
on the inability of a segment of the population to adapt and benefit from globalization because they 
are ill-equipped to do so in terms of qualifications, competencies and means.  
 In the post-industrial era, these people consider themselves abandoned by the mainstream 
parties which they accuse of being too lenient at allowing outsiders in to ‘steal’ their jobs (Givens 
2002: 140). There are two main areas of resentment and insecurity: economic and nationalist. The 
former is an extension of what has been dealt with so far in this chapter: the perception that migrant 
workers increase competition for jobs, depress wages and overuse welfare. Radical right parties prey 
on the sentiment of disillusionment by first drawing a line between ‘outsiders’ who are the migrants 
let in to work and ‘insiders’ who are the citizens. This is an aspect of issue framing referred to as 
‘conflict’ framing whereby there is a division between ‘us’ and ‘them’ in order to differentiate who 
are responsible and to be blamed for a set of problems (Harris 2010: 51-52). These parties then 
proceed to blame unemployment and other economic woes on the outsiders who become the 
scapegoat and the common enemy on whom the energies of the electorate are called to be focussed. 
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 Outsiders bring their cultures and when they are present in large numbers, they give the 
impression to locals that they have lost their national identity because of the dilution of their culture. 
This is the foundation of the second area of resentment: erosion of national identity and pride 
(Guibernau 2010: 14). This sentiment is further accentuated by right-wing parties which base their 
agenda on the perceived erosion of culture which some term as a ‘leveling down’ because the local 
culture is deemed to be lessened by the infusion of other cultures considered not as rich (Aksoy 2011: 
30). The government is often accused of being unnationalistic and unworthy of representing the 
population because it is allowing the national identity to be lost by admitting migrants. The group of 
people who subscribe to rightist parties because of the perceived annihilation of national identity is 
more diverse than those joining because they feel economically left out. This group involves many 
average citizens who are attracted because of the patriotic slant to these parties’ message. 
 The trend of more citizen support for extreme right agendas has had at least two results. First, 
as countries open up to globalization, people who are unable to keep up find appeal in extreme right 
agendas and swell the ranks of extreme right parties (Eatwell 2000: 416). The onslaught on the 
government can thus be more organized and because of the numbers, it can have a significant impact 
on mainstream parties who may now need to form coalition governments with right wing parties. 
Second, mainstream parties may borrow part of the extreme right parties’ agenda and toughen their 
stance on migrant labour in order not to lose too much support. Sarkozy in France is a case in point 
for using such tactics (Marthaler 2009: 75).  
 It may not matter whether foreign labour is unjustly being scapegoated for political gain. 
Instead, ‘causal’ issue framing can be used to draw and promulgate a causal mechanism that appeal to 
citizens (Stone 1989: 283). Despite works by scholars demonstrating the contrary of the alleged 
negative economic and cultural impact that migrants have on society, right wing parties appeal to the 
ease with which others can be blamed for one’s problems. Many have tried to account for the reasons 
as to why citizens hold certain perceptions predisposes them to being suspicious of migrants and 
therefore good recruitment targets for right wing parties. 
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Sides and Citrin (2007: 500) conclude that most Europeans are concerned with the influx of 
migrants and tend to overestimate the number of immigrants in their countries. ‘Symbolic’ 
predispositions such as preference for cultural unity garner more opposition to migration than 
economic factors. The misperception that there are more immigrants than there actually are in their 
respective countries results in more opposition to migration. Therefore, immigrants are blamed for 
crowding on public transport, high competition for housing and other resources. Natives judge with 
their heart and do not bother to gather more information about immigration in their countries. Their 
opposition to immigration is often fuelled by misperceptions. However, this conclusion is arrived at 
after examining immigration at large. In the case of migrant labour, this may not be true since migrant 
labour skews observations towards economic factors by virtue of being admitted by the government to 
work. 
Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) discuss the correlation between the level of education and 
attitudes towards immigration in their Europe-based study. Their starting point is the findings from 
other studies that there is not much effect from immigration flows on income or employment. They 
find that people with higher levels of education and occupational skills tend to be more in favour of 
immigration than those who are less educated or skilled, regardless of the level of education or skill of 
immigrants. This is not because of personal economic factors but because educated respondents are 
significantly less racist and place greater value on cultural diversity. They also more readily accept the 
proposition that immigration generates benefits for the host economy on the whole. 
Brader, Valenti and Suhay (2008) conducted a study of whether Americans have the same 
reaction to immigration regardless of the migrants’ origin. They find that anxiety is generated by 
some migrants more than others. For example, white people are more receptive to European migrants 
than to those from Central and Latin America. The authors use the term “group cues” for the reaction 
that a certain group of migrants generates in locals. These group cues trigger emotions like anxiety 
that lead to opposition of certain groups of migrants based on preconceived ideas about them. They 
suggest that the public is prone to error and manipulation when group cues lead to anxiety unrelated to 




There is much tension between proponents of immigrants’ rights (including those of illegal 
immigrants) and those who want to ensure the security of their country. Especially after the 
September 11 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, immigration policies have become 
increasingly conservative (De Laet 2006: 68, Nguyen 2005: 143-144). There has been a surge in the 
number of individuals removed and deported without due processing for the sake of expeditiousness 
(De Laet 2006: 74). Migrants are not informed of their possibilities to be granted asylum or chances 
of being naturalized. They are not provided with interpreters to ask them whether they fear returning 
home. They are just deported with no second thoughts about whether doing so would put them in 
grievous danger or lead to them losing their lives.  
There has also been an increase of arbitrary and long detentions without trial especially for 
those arrested in cases of crimes, even petty crimes (Nguyen 2005: 7). Meanwhile, those who wanted 
to migrate from certain parts of the world from which terrorists are believed to originate are not able 
to do so as easily as before even though they are not terrorists and never had a brush with the law in 
their country of origin. They are nonetheless classified under the same group as potential terrorists 
and refused entry in most cases. Discriminatory policies towards a certain group of immigrants have 
also fuelled scapegoating, attacks and unjustified actions from natives towards them. There has been a 
spike in hate crimes targeted at the Muslim community (Nguyen 2005: 6). The liberal democratic 
rights earlier mentioned are suddenly overshadowed by security concerns. 
The security paranoia that 9/11 has introduced worldwide has strengthened the resolve of 
some politicians to oppose migrant labour policies and citizens to be more fervent in supporting them. 
Issue framing has prevailed in portraying people from certain regions of the world as potential 
terrorists and undesirable. Although it is not logical to expect that everyone from the Middle East or 
of Muslim faith is a terrorist, the stunning effect of terrorist attacks has made a significant number of 




The following hypothesis can be formed from this part of the chapter: 
H2: A government will garner citizens’ support for migrant labour policies if it can successfully tackle 
political actors with extreme right political agenda that use issue framing to scapegoat migrants. 
Geography 
Migrant workers do not uniformly settle across the whole receiving country. Instead their location is 
dictated by factors such as where previous batches of immigrants or their relatives are located, 
proximity to the border with their countries of origin and places where the labour market for the jobs 
they can take up is flourishing. This results in some electoral regions having more migrants than 
others (Money 1999: 48). 
 Many receiving countries have tried to dictate where migrants settle but have mostly met with 
failure (Richmond 1994: 118). In the case of Canada, migrants were admitted to work in rural farms. 
With time, these farmers were drawn towards city jobs and migrated internally to cities. Migrants 
settle wherever they can advance their situations and it is tedious to control such internal flows.  
 The concentration of migrants can lead to various repercussions. Migrant communities can 
form ghettos but at the same time they can provide support for new migrants. Therefore, the 
community acts like a shield against the locals and a springboard for new immigrants to launch their 
new lives from. These ghettos can protect migrants. However, they can also be singled out for attacks 
by locals and are irrationally linked to crimes, protection cartels and poverty. In a more optimistic 
light, the fact that there is a relatively large number of migrants who share the same space as the 
locals may eventually lead to locals adapting to them and being more welcoming (Money 1999: 53). 
However, migrants have to immerse themselves into the host society instead of creating a microcosm 
of their society of origin. 
 Money has observed that the peak of protests against immigrants would be reached when 
there is economic downturn and when the labour markets are flexible (1999: 54). Given these two 
conditions, migrants would pose an economic threat to locals because they can act as a substitute to 
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local employees, sometimes require less pay and in cases of economic downturn, people would be less 
willing to share the fewer jobs. The opposite is true when either condition is absent. 
 Politicians would mirror their political agenda on the feelings of the people. If, for example, 
there is an economic downturn and locals (voters) blame immigrants for taking their jobs, politicians 
would press for anti-immigration policies in a bid to gather more votes. Votes at the regional level 
will only be translated to the national level when they belong to swing regions. Migrant labour is just 
one issue on the agenda. If a party at the national level knows that a particular region will most 
probably vote in their favour, it may not address the immigration concerns. However, when the region 
may or may not vote in their favour, it will try to win more voters by addressing immigration issues. 
 Money notices that immigrants are sometimes reluctant to be naturalized and therefore would 
not be able to participate politically (1999:  55). This is because they are not willing to sacrifice their 
original citizenship which they often cannot hold concurrently with another citizenship and they want 
to have their existing citizenship as a fall-back position in case it does not work out in their receiving 
country. There are various modes of staying in a country while not being a citizen: some are on work 
permits or are permanent residents. As was earlier discussed, this may raise the suspicions of citizens 
who may conclude that migrants are unwilling to assimilate and instead want to inject elements of 
their culture into their host society (Guibernau 2010: 13). 
The reluctance to take up the citizenship of their host country may not be true for many 
migrant workers. In the case of immigrants to the United States over time, many became citizens and 
influence votes (Fuchs 1956: 271-273). Fuchs describes the preferences by political parties of groups 
of immigrants over others in the American political scene through the years. Groups of immigrants 
had to be courted by political parties at various times for their votes. These groups found their power 
in their numbers since appealing to one of the groups could end up shifting one block of voters 
towards voting for a party. For these immigrants to be voters, they had to be citizens first. 
 Based on the geographical viewpoint, support from locals for immigration policies can be 
influenced by the economic situation, the number of immigrants and the flexibility of the labour 
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market. If immigrants are assimilated into the local population, there will be less animosity against 
them. However, by forming ghettoes, migrants instil symbols in citizens’ minds and those are often 
linked to crimes and poverty. This could later lead to citizens not supporting migrant labour policies 
since they associate migrant labour with negative symbols that are inculcated when young.  Migrants 
can also influence immigration policies by becoming citizens and actively participating in the political 
scene by voting or driving policy. Immigration policies at the regional level will likely be floated to 
the national level in cases of swing constituencies. 
This part of the chapter yields the following hypotheses: 
H3: Support for migrant labour policies will be lower when the economy is not performing well. 
H4: Citizens’ support for foreign labour policies is inversely correlated with the perception of the size 
of the foreign labour population. 
H1 can be further improved to: 
H1: A government will obtain support from citizens for migrant labour policies when they are not 
perceived by citizens as affecting their economic interests and national identity. 
HERESTHETICS 
William Riker (1986) introduced the concept of heresthetics to describe manipulations of electoral 
outcome by politicians. The latter may be in power, in minority or new entrants who astutely seek to 
gain an advantage during elections by ways other than traditional rhetoric. The means employed 
include, but are not limited to, gerrymandering, repacking or renaming of issues or presenting them in 
a different way, changing the way votes are counted, rendering voting inaccessible by changing 
voting venues, altering legislature related to voting and so forth.  
Manipulating various factors linked to elections instead of trying to win over voters’ support 
by changing their opinion on a certain policy results in an untenable conclusion on voters’ acceptance 
of the issue. This is due to the fact that the systemic factors have been changed thus leading to 
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electoral advantage for the politician instead of the status of support of voters. It is obvious that 
modifying the system such that the will of the people cannot translate into true representation of their 
support for certain policies is a serious blow to democracy. However, for the sake of winning 
elections and this is probably a fundamental reason why individuals engage in politics, many engage 
in heresthetics. 
The implication for the current study, which seeks to measure the support of citizens for 
migrant labour policy, is that there are a certain number of variables that have to be controlled or 
taken into consideration in order to eliminate the effect of heresthetics on the results. The next chapter 
will discuss how this could be achieved for the case studies suggested. 
CONCLUSION 
At the start of this chapter, I presented a framework of citizens’ support of government policies. I then 
proceeded to survey the literature dealing with why people are unhappy about immigration policies 
and why some governments are not able to satisfy locals with their immigration policies. There are 
two categories of reasons why people are not supportive of migrant labour policies: self-interest and 
symbolic politics.  
 Governments have to balance the needs of capitalists for labour, the expectations of locals for 
protection of their jobs, past immigrants clamouring for their rights to be reunited with their relatives 
regardless of whether the latter would fit the economic requirements of the receiving country, illegal 
immigration and pressure from rights group to allow immigrants to move in simply because they are 
deemed to have the right. During economic downturns, support for migrant labour policies dwindles, 
leading to further opposition to economic migrants. 
As politicians, the government also has to deal with political actors with extreme right 
agendas which distort the effect of immigration on locals, often for political gain. Migrant labour is 
















The hypotheses formulated in the previous chapter will be tested using the case study method. Four 
countries that are importers of labour will be examined: France, Canada, Singapore and United Arab 
Emirates (Dubai). Countries cannot be chosen randomly because not all countries import labour. 
Instead, cases are chosen for their ability to provide the necessary information to test the hypotheses 
formulated. I employ the small n case study method because it allows detailed examination of each 
case and can thus help to elucidate causes behind the findings.  
Each case will be subjected to a longitudinal analysis over an appropriate period of time.  
Trends in citizens’ support, or the lack thereof, for migrant labour policies as propounded by the 
governments that have ruled or are still in power in the four countries can then be observed. 
Longitudinal examinations will offer a control of certain variables that can be assumed to remain 
constant over different periods. Thereafter, the findings for the four cases will be compared across 
cases. It is expected that cross case similarities and differences can be matched to case characteristics 
to verify the hypotheses earlier formulated. 
CASE STUDY METHOD 
The case study method, while flawed, has its advantages. George and Bennett (2005) argued that this 
approach promotes conceptual refining instead of conceptual stretching often witnessed in the 
quantitative method. The latter can be defined as increasing the number of cases by loosening the 
definition of certain parameters such that cases can be grouped together (George and Bennett 2005: 
19). This is sometimes necessary when the number of cases is too small for viable statistical analysis. 
The case study method thrives on a small number of cases that are examined in depth.  
No two cases are the same and through close investigation, one can single out aspects of a 
case that can be compared to those of another while staying true to the dissimilarities of both (George 
and Bennett 2005: 19). Aspects that may not be exactly the same across cases are instead conceptual 
equivalents that allow different cases to be compared. In the current study, this is very useful, for 
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example, in comparing the animosity of citizens towards migrant labour policies. The same lack of 
support can be expressed differently in two cases. In some countries people can take to the streets 
while in others they can express displeasure through blogs, online forums and so forth. It would be 
inaccurate to conclude that those who protested en masse demonstrated greater opposition to the 
policy. People from either country may possess the same sentiments except that in one case, people 
are limited by factors that prevent a more public display of their disagreement. Such findings can only 
be arrived at through detailed contextual considerations of each case. 
 The case study method also allows in-depth examination of causal mechanisms (George and 
Bennett 2005: 21). It is thus possible to examine large numbers of variables and determine which ones 
are necessary for a certain causal mechanism to be triggered. The statistical method that pre-codifies 
variables often leaves out certain variables that may have explanatory value. As pointed out in the 
previous chapter, a significant number of factors can affect the measurement of support for a certain 
migrant labour policy. These factors would in turn result in erroneous conclusions being made 
concerning how successful the policy is with citizens. There are two crucial aspects of the case study 
method in this instance: i) the method will allow deeper investigation of the contribution of variables 
to the causal mechanism, and ii) the variables that contribute to the causal mechanism, although not 
predetermined to have the properties to do so, will not be discarded prior to the study but instead may 
be discovered to be playing vital or supporting roles in the causal explanation. The resulting theory 
will thus be richer and more complete. 
 Finally, the case study method will permit us to tackle complex causal relations (Bennett and 
Elman 2006: 251). These include complex interaction effects and path dependency. Through process 
tracing, it is possible to parse the root cause of a certain phenomenon. For example, sentiments against 
migrant labour may hypothetically be a result of animosity against a certain group of people because 
of their country of origin that used to be at war with the receiving country many years ago. Without 
going back in time to trace this cause, it may be hard to explain using, say, economic factors alone, 
why there appear to be irrational sentiments against a certain group of people and not others.  
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 George and Bennett warn against choosing cases in which both the independent and 
dependent variables would lead to the hypotheses being verified (2005:24). Consider my first 
hypothesis.  This could take the form of selecting only known cases whereby the government faces 
rejection because migrant labour policies deemed detrimental to the economic interest and national 
identity of citizens are implemented. Since all cases would yield the same results by virtue of the 
narrow selection, the hypothesis would be verified. Cases would have effectively been selected 
because they verify the hypothesis and not as a way to test it. 
 Another limitation of the case study method is the generalizability of the resulting theory. 
Since the study is based on a few cases, it may not be fair or accurate to conclude that the theory 
formed as a result of the study would apply broadly.  Neither can the weight attributed to the effect of 
each variable in the causal mechanism be determined accurately. This is because it is rare for just one 
variable of the case to change so that its exact effect can be measured.  Rather, the case study method 
is strong at analysing whether and how the variable affects the outcome of the case because of its in-
depth study of the case which does not discard variables upfront (George and Bennett 2005: 21).   
RESEARCH PROBLEM 
The purpose of this research is to respond to the following question: “why are migrant labour policies 
negatively perceived by citizens?” It is appropriate at this juncture to elaborate on how one would 
recognise a successful migration policy in the context of this thesis. As mentioned earlier, I chose not 
to focus on the humanistic aspect of both the citizens and the immigrants. Instead, I gauge the success 
or failure of a migration policy by observing citizens’ reaction towards it. A policy is not successful if 
citizens vote or protest against governments that devise it. Based on laymen knowledge of relatively 
closed political systems such as Singapore and more so, Dubai, one could look at this approach with 
suspicion. However, when tackling these cases and the other two, I will present evidence to support 




The following hypotheses are formulated based on a synthesis of previous research carried out in this 
field by other researchers:  
H1: A government will obtain support from citizens for migrant labour policies when they are not 
perceived by citizens as affecting their economic interests and national identity
3
. 
H2: A government will garner citizens’ support for migrant labour policies if it can successfully tackle 
political actors with extreme right political agenda that use issue-framing to scapegoat migrants. 
H3: Support for migrant labour policies will be lower when there is an economic downturn. 
H4: Citizens’ support for foreign labour policies is inversely correlated with the perception of the size 
of the foreign labour population. 
 The case must be a country with a government that has some form of clearly articulated 
policy about migrant labour, the policy must be recognizable so that it can be investigated, and there 
must be a way to measure the support of citizens for it. The support or protest of citizens can be 
measured in various ways such as how political parties with certain migrant labour policies fare at 
elections and how their support level  varies over time when the government hardens or softens its 
stand on migrant labour policy.  
 The second hypothesis can only be tested when the country in question has political actors 
who are actively trying to influence the people over migrant labour policy. These actors can be 
extreme right parties, rightist parties or parties that use some rightist policies to boost their share of 
the votes. They can also be unions, associations and organizations that lead scapegoating campaigns 
against migrant workers to push an agenda but not to seek election. The important component here is 
an organized actor that promotes ill feelings towards migrant labour policies. 
                                                          
3
 This statement does not suggest that economic interests and national identity are the same. Instead, these are 




 The third hypothesis requires a difference in the economic performance of the country in 
question over the period being analysed. This will provide the essential setting to investigate the level 
of support of citizens during periods of economic uncertainty. For instance, if an anti-migrant labour 
protest occurs amid economic crisis and does not occur when the economy is doing well, while other 
variables remain unchanged, this would suggest that the state of the economy plays a part in the 
support for migrant labour policies.  To test this hypothesis, the case must present enough data so that 
both the economic performance and the support for migrant labour policies can be measured.  
 The final hypothesis can be verified by correlating the level of support of citizens for migrant 
labour policies with actual increases in the population of the migrant workforce. Perception can be 
measured by having respondents state how they feel about the number of migrant workers amongst 
them and how many they believe there are. There has been research done in this field for each of the 
cases selected and I intend to tap on them to derive trends. Another way is to examine what the public 
has expressed in the media. The latter does not work in all cases since the media enjoys different 
levels of freedom in each country. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
According to Gerring (2001), ten factors characterize a viable research design: plenitude, 
boundedness, comparability, independence, representativeness, variation, analytic utility, replicability, 
mechanism and causal comparison. I follow this comprehensive framework to arrive at a research 
design that fulfils the best practices highlighted by the author. 
In the current thesis, I propose to examine four cases which are related because they are all 
importers of labour and would allow comparison of how migrant labour policies have been 
formulated and implemented. A single case would not have offered any comparison and we would not 
be able to learn much as a result. That case would also exclude other cases that could potentially 
contradict its findings. Four cases, straddled across the globe yet similar in certain aspects, offer many 
points of comparison. The study is not limited to cross case comparisons, it includes within case 
comparisons. This multiplies the number of events under examination. Four cases (as opposed to one 
32 
 
case) also ensure that factors identified as sufficient for an event to occur are consistent across cases. 
This allows us to verify how spurious causal linkages are. Four randomly selected cases offer the 
possibility to observe the regularity with which an event leads to another thus confirming that the 
occurrence is not isolated. 
 As Gerring pointed out, cases can only be compared when they share concepts that are similar 
and these can usually be translated into numbers (2001: 41). There are a few numbers that can be 
found across all cases while others can only be found for some cases. The number of migrant workers 
being admitted over time, the percentage of migrants within the total population, election results and 
percentages of votes going to a party are some numbers that can be compared across most of the 
cases. Cases need not share exactly the same attributes for them to be comparable. Some cases may 
resemble one another remotely and yet be compared because they respond similarly to certain stimuli 
or the remaining differences can be accounted for by analysis (Gerring 2001: 174-175). In this study, 
such stimuli could be economic downturn, a policy introducing quotas to the number of migrant 
workers admitted and formation of an entity with an extreme right agenda. Where results of stimuli 
differ, I posit explanations for the variation. The differences across cases have to be identified and 
controlled so that the cases can effectively be compared. 
 The distinctiveness of the cases ensures maximum coverage and representation of other 
similar cases. The chosen cases can therefore be seen as a microcosm of the overall picture relating to 
how governments deal with their citizens on the subject of migrant labour. This does not mean that all 
cases would be the same. Rather, similarity of the cases makes them representative of those cases they 
are similar to. The randomness used in selecting cases amongst the various possible cases in Europe, 
North America, Asia and the Middle East ensures that the cases are representative instead of the 
selection being biased.  
 If there is no variation in either the independent or dependent variables, it would be harder to 
ascertain whether the deemed causes of a phenomenon are responsible or spurious. This is because 
there would be no way of knowing what the effect a certain posited cause would have resulted in. In 
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this study, there is variation in the dependent variable because sometimes citizens are agreeable to 
migrant labour policies while in other cases they are not. The variation should be regular so that we 
would be able to make sense of the results. If the same set of independent variables yields different 
results in the same case across time or across cases, no definite conclusion can be arrived at.   
Gerring mentioned that choosing cases where the independent variable varies is likely to 
result in having cases where the independent variable also varies (2001: 189). Variation in the 
independent variable is important because it allows us to verify the spuriousness of the causal 
relationship being studied. If, for example, the economic threat perceived by citizens is determined to 
be the sole reason why citizens do not support migrant labour policies, there must be another case 
where there is no such perception and the result is the opposite in order for us to determine with 
certainty that the posited independent variable is indeed real. We should also ensure that all relevant 
possible independent variables are examined as we could miss out some that have effects on the 
dependent variable and have an incomplete study. In this thesis, the relevant independent variables 
were identified in the previous chapter.  
Of the four selected cases, the one that stands out is the United Arab Emirates, a grouping of 
emirates that does not rely on a democratic system to elect leaders and is a heavy importer of migrant 
labour. The emirates can decide independently on policies and are not homogenous in their approach 
to migrant labour. In order to avoid the pitfall of over-generalizing, I will concentrate on Dubai 
because it has enjoyed a booming economy and is a relatively large importer of migrant labour as 
compared to the other emirates. While some may question the ability of citizens to protest, I will show 
that citizens do so in certain cases. This will demonstrate that citizens do not agree to migrant labour 
policies because they have no other choice. This case is important because it is an outlier that could 
help test the robustness of the theory.  
 France and Canada are well known long time importers of labour. Both have seen many 
changes and adjustments in the past and various respective governments have pre-empted and 
responded in different ways to citizens’ reaction to migrant labour policies. The large number of 
policy changes makes these two cases very rich sources of information because of a wide range of 
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what could be seen as experiments conducted by the ruling parties in an attempt to strike the right 
balance that would satisfy the electorate. France and Canada and Singapore and Dubai are more 
appropriately compared in pairs because of their similar migrant labour and political realities. 
However, it would add value if a finding in one case were to be true across cases. I will therefore join 
the four cases through comparison where possible.  
The difference in geographical locations of the four cases eliminates the influence of certain 
factors and external shocks that may affect countries that are located close to each other. An example 
of such shocks is regional war which may affect results for a group of countries which are in close 
proximity to one another. If too many cases are chosen within this group of countries, the effect of 
that shock may lead to a trend in the results that deviates from what could be observed in normal 
times. The resulting conclusion would be applicable to times when the shock is present thus limiting 
the usefulness of the theory. 
The analytic utility of this thesis is enhanced by the fact that it covers prominent countries 
where labour is imported and does that on a regional level. Certain cases cannot be missed out when 
looking at migrant labour policies because they are major importers of labour and it would be odd to 
leave them out. At a regional level, the cases that have been identified are such cases. Only Canada is 
selected, instead of including the US as well, so as not to skew the research towards North America. 
Many studies have focussed on the US and it would bring more to the literature to study another 
country that has not been as extensively and intensively studied. Migrant labour policies in the US are 
also not uniform across states. Taking the US as a unit of analysis would be over-simplifying and lead 
to conclusions that may not be true across the country. For lack of resources, the US case cannot be 
adequately tackled in this thesis. There are a number of candidates that could similarly have been 
selected in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. Many countries in Europe import labour. France is 
chosen because of the limited space in this thesis as well as my fluency in French which allows me to 
examine more literature in depth.  
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 The current research is replicable because the data used for the research is available. This is 
important because of my heavy reliance on secondary materials. I also explain and lay out the specific 
procedures used to obtain the data and list down the sources. By doing so, any ambiguity in the data 
and information used will not arise because it would be possible for others to go directly to the 
sources and analyse them. I also gathered some primary data consisting mainly of direct citizens’ 
contributions to forums and in blogs.  
 Process tracing will be used to bolster the relationship between the presumed cause and its 
effect. The causal mechanism can thus be identified and presented so as to add value to the 
explanatory value of the theories that are developed. The use of small n case study method allows the 
researcher to go in greater depth in the case and it is possible to develop the step by step mechanism 
behind a certain event.  
Once the causal mechanisms have been laid out, they are compared within cases and across 
them. A regular causal mechanism across cases helps by giving greater credit to the applicability of 
the theory.  
In all four cases, data is available although not always completely in some cases. This is not 
only a result of the transparency demanded by citizens but in the case of Singapore, for instance, data 
is made available to show that the government is listening to the complaints of citizens and is taking 
actions. Singapore is singled out here to highlight the common criticism that information is sometimes 
framed to drive an agenda. Care has to be exercised in handling information released by those who 
stand to gain from it being portrayed a particular way. I will expound more on the cases in the next 
chapters. 
DATA GATHERING 
Data will be gathered mainly through secondary research. This is necessary for lack of means that 
prevents me from visiting all four countries to collect data. I instead leverage on the many studies that 
have been carried out from different angles on migrant labour, policies and the reaction of citizens in 
our four cases. The rich sources of historical data gathered by others will benefit this thesis. Some of 
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the data will also be gleaned from media reporting and official government and independent statistical 
sources although it cannot be excluded that the sources have an agenda and have presented data such 
that the user would be lead to think of the issue in a certain way. The data should be treated with care. 
A number of factors can affect support for government policies. These factors must be 
controlled such that the causal mechanism between a policy and the support of citizens for it can be 
ascertained. An in-depth study of the case would allow us to remove some of the explanatory 
variables that could result in an inaccurate conclusion. For instance, if the party in power has redrawn 
electoral boundaries in a first-past-the-post system to dilute areas that are known to be anti-migrant 
labour with areas that are neutral or pro-migrant labour to effect a net support or neutral result, 
studying such a case can alert us that this has been done and to subtract the effect of this heresthetic 
manipulation. If this is not done, one could conclude erroneously that the policy is successful with 
voters when in fact gerrymandering has created results favouring a party that redrew boundaries to 
mitigate the effect of some circumscriptions that are hostile to migrant labour. 
 The use of election results to measure public support of a policy will be very tedious because 
many mainstream parties tend to have broad agendas. Voters’ lack of support for a party may not be 
because the party has a certain stand on migrant labour. Instead it may be because of other issues. 
There are at least two ways one can resolve this problem. First, I can examine the results of parties 
which have anti-migrant labour stand as their main agenda. If these parties fare well, it would be 
worthwhile to look at why they are successful and are able to pull votes away from mainstream parties 
that do not have an anti-migrant labour stand or have a milder stand.  
Another way is to delve deeper into reactions of the public vis-à-vis new migrant labour 
policies. Protests and reported incidents against migrant labour policies would be helpful. Media 
reporting and interviews of those who take part in these demonstrations can give valuable insight into 
why people are protesting to begin with and what their concerns are. Results of these interviews can 
then be presented in the light of other information such as the number of migrant workers or loss of 




A system of coding ensures the cases can be compared effectively. This entails defining instances that 
allows us to determine whether an event (cause or effect) has occurred. An example of such an event 
would be protest against a policy that allows too many migrants (as perceived by citizens) to be 
admitted that can be observed through progress of far right parties from one major election to another. 
An increase in the percentage of votes garnered by such parties clearly indicates that citizens (in cases 
where they are the only ones with voting rights) do not support the current migrant policies. In this 
section I will systematically look at the hypothesis and describe when each of the variables can be 
determined as being present. 
 Migrant labour policies are formulated by governments regarding the admission of workers at 
any level of skill from abroad into the country. Such policies are the main independent variable. The 
perception by citizens of the effects of such policies will be an intervening variable. These could be 
perceptions that migrant labour policies affect citizens’ economic interests and national identity. The 
resulting support or non-support of the policies is the dependent variable. According to H1: A 
government will obtain support from citizens for migrant labour policies when they are not perceived 
by citizens as affecting their economic interests and national identity, the perception that their 
economic interests, national identity or both being compromised by government’s migrant labour 
policies would result in citizens not supporting them. 
 Political actors with extreme right agendas can use issue framing to weaken the position of a 
government with regards to migrant labour policies. These political actors are mainly extreme right 
political parties such as the French Front National. One way to study the influence of these political 
actors is to seize on their performance at elections. Another is to determine their influence on 
mainstream parties’ agenda. For the first approach, I examine intra-case progress of these parties in 
terms of percentage of votes they garner at major elections such as presidential and parliamentary 
elections. This will show the trend in support for these actors and the reasons for spikes can be found 
using process tracing.  
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 For the second approach, I explore shifts in policy agendas of main parties to uncover 
whether there are some actors that have used ways such as protests or direct lobbies to influence 
parties’ agenda. For instance, if there is a group that constantly presses for fewer migrants and 
succeeds and other parties take notice and change their agendas accordingly, it can be deduced that 
they had an impact on mainstream parties’ policies. In this case, popular support for these actors 
would demonstrate how citizens feel about government policies. 
 To discover how support for migrant labour policies fare when there is an economic 
downturn, I investigate shifts in voting patterns. It is assumed that economic downturn would lead to 
less support for migrant labour policy because locals want less competition for jobs that become 
scarce. 
 How voters perceive the size of the migrant labour population can be investigated by studying 
citizens’ reasons for not supporting a migrant labour policy admitting more migrants. The perception 
of the size of the migrant labour population can take three values which often take the form of “too 
few”, “just right” or “too many”. It is posited in this thesis that citizens will not support migrant 
labour policies when they perceive that there are too many migrants in the country. 
CONCLUSION 
The hypotheses developed in the previous chapter will be verified using the small-n case study 
method. This method is selected for its ability for in-depth investigation that helps ascertain causal 
relationships. The goodness of the proposed method has been examined through the lens of Gerring’s 
ten factors.  Four cases have been selected because they import labour and because they are 
geographically diverse thus extending the representativeness of the study and enhancing the 
applicability of the resulting theory. I have also defined how the various events constituting the 

















The French case can be divided into two periods: post-WWII to 1974 and 1974 to present. The 
triggering point for the second period was an economic crisis that saw many changes in the way 
France treats migration. It was also the onset of the issue being politicized. France exhibits a vibrant 
political system where power can swerve from one group of parties to another based on certain 
agendas and expectations of the population. With regards to migrant labour policy and immigration in 
general, the National Front has become a fixture that cannot be neglected. Any discussion of the 
French case that does not consider the Front National would be largely incomplete because it has 
successfully propelled itself onto the national political scene by championing racist and anti-
immigration policies. It has managed to grab the attention of the electorate and of mainstream parties. 
POST-WWII – 1974  
The French economy emerged from WWII extensively damaged by the long and exploitative 
occupation of Nazi Germany. Like many countries that had been directly affected by the war, France 
found itself in need of workers to rebuild its industries but they were not available internally. It turned 
abroad to recruit but did not do so indiscriminately. Workers who were deemed to be able to be 
integrated into French society were given priority. These were mainly from Spain and Italy and there 
was a long term policy that these workers would immigrate permanently to France (Wadia 1999: 
173). Therefore the double role of the immigration policy was to firstly, allow migrants in to 
repopulate and make France great again but not at the expense of the national identity and secondly, 
to supply labour. France had also ratified the Geneva Convention in 1951 and was receptive to asylum 
seekers. 
 The devastation of WWII was widespread and other economies needed workers too. It was 
not long before France faced stiff competition for workers that it deemed would not affect France’s 
national identity. The competition came from the same source countries that France preferred the 
migrants to originate. The growing shortage of workers compelled France to increasingly turn to 
former colonies in Africa, especially Algeria, despite this not being the preference (Stalker 1994: 17).  
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From 1944 to the 1960s, employers grouped under the Conseil National du Patronat Français 
(CNPF) kept pressuring the government to find more workers (Wadia 1999: 176). In 1947, one 
million workers were needed in France. The French economy became stable in the 1950s and 1960s 
propelled largely by a strong tertiary sector. French people were no longer willing to take up low 
status jobs (such as in the construction industry). Economic reasons won against nationalistic ones and 
France started admitting not only Algerians but sub-Saharan Africans to fill these jobs (Stalker 1994: 
194). For these migrants, the low skilled jobs in France were better than unemployment in their home 
countries. Automation did help the situation and workers became more specialised. This did not 
contribute to resolving the manpower crunch because the growing economy needed still more workers 
while specialised workers were mobile and did not have to remain in France (Wadia 1999: 178). 
By 1974, 63% of those migrating to France did so to reunite with their family members who 
came earlier to work. Only about a quarter of all migrants was being admitted as migrant labour 
(Wadia 1999: 182). A hierarchy of rejection by locals had started to take shape: Europeans were the 
most accepted (Italians were preferred ahead of Spaniards and Portuguese), followed by Asians whose 
numbers started increasing in the mid-1970s with the arrival of “boat people” from Southeast Asia, 
the sub-Saharan Africans and lastly the North Africans. Amongst the latter, Algerians have been the 
most stigmatized largely because of the war of independence that Algeria waged against France in the 
1950s and 1960s (Gastaut 2001).  
The first recession post-WWII came with the 1974 oil shock and by the summer of 1975 there 
were one million job seekers in France (Bizimana and Lacan 2010: 2). There was a stark increase in 
unemployed migrants probably not helped by the fact that many of those who had come recently were 
not admitted because they were suitable for the workforce but for family reunification. Migrant rights 
groups had fought for the rights of families to be reunited with those who had gone to France to work 
and successfully lobbied governments to relax admission criteria for relatives. These lived in ghettoes 
concentrated around the main industrial centres and there was a perception by locals that immigrant 
youths did nothing better than engage in public disorder that was destabilizing French society 
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(Laachir 2007: 99). There was also widespread perception that migrants were taking jobs that should 
rightfully go to locals. 
A major issue of contention was the taking up of French nationality. Prior to 1974, there was 
resistance by many against becoming French citizens. Many of those were Algerians who did not see 
themselves being in France permanently. Others took up dual citizenship for practical reasons. The 
French saw this as a clear indication that migrants in general were not willing to conform to the 
French way of life. The perception was accentuated by the fact that many first generation migrants 
would influence second and third generations to observe the traditions and cultures of their countries 
of origin. There were incidents involving the wearing of head scarfs for instance which were 
perceived by the French as being a rejection of French culture (Wadia 1999: 187).  
Many migrants from former French colonies demanded equal rights in maintaining their 
cultures and traditions. However, for the French this was contradictory to the aim of colonization 
which was the imposition of French values and culture on what were seen as backward peoples. When 
migrants from ex-colonies were admitted they were supposed to have been inculcated French values 
and culture and be able to integrate. Non-Europeans became more visible when they engaged in 
strikes complaining about poor lodging conditions. These actions started in 1968 and intensified in the 
1970s. Instead of attracting compassion for their cause, they were instead seen as troublemakers 
(Wadia 199: 189). 
The economic recession of 1974 saw a shift in the way France looked at migrant labour and 
immigration in general. Previously, the government handled migrant labour issues through decrees 
and circulars which went unchallenged because most accepted the fact that France needed more 
people to work. However, once unemployment rose, the issue of migrant labour was politicized and 
became the object of much activism (Rosello 2001: 23).  
The situation around 1974 points to a growing malaise amongst the French population as a 
result of the laissez-faire policy of admitting migrant labour. When France needed workers, 
complaints were rare and centred around erosion of French culture and national identity. There was 
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more tolerance. The migrant admission landscape changed to a point that France was no longer 
admitting a majority of migrants it needed for the economy. Instead, most of those admitted came to 
join their family. This resulted in a decrease in economic benefits and an increase in the social unease 
regarding migrants. High unemployment rates resulting from recession would lead to changes. The 
observations so far support hypotheses H1, H3 and H4: 
H1: A government will obtain support from citizens for migrant labour policies when they are not 
perceived by citizens as affecting their economic interests and national identity. 
H3: Support for migrant labour policies will be lower when there is an economic downturn. 
H4: Citizens’ support for foreign labour policies is inversely correlated with the perception of the size 
of the foreign labour population. 
POST-1974 
In 1977, the French government banned the importation of migrant workers and placed a three-year 
moratorium on family reunification. The latter was later rescinded because of vast pressure from pro-
immigrant groups. From 1975 the French government began encouraging those who had come to 
France for less than five years to return to their home country (Slater 1979: 3). This could be seen as 
the French government trying to manage a migrant labour situation that was no longer sustainable and 
to appease citizens. With recession, employment was scarce and migrant workers were increasingly 
seen as a social and political issue. There were clashes between the French and migrants. One such 
example is the French-Algerian clashes of 1973 in various places in France, especially at Marseilles, 
which saw about 50 killed and 300 others injured (Gastaut 1993: 71). This and other animosity led to 
very low support of the French for more migrants.  
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The presidential elections of 1981 which pitted the government of Raymond Barre
4
 against 
the left opposition was coloured by debates about who would be able to control the immigration issue 
and put an end to illegal migration. The French Communist Party (PCF) led a campaign against 
migrant workers and called for their repatriation as well as a stop to immigration. The PCF also 
accused immigrants of propagating the sale of drugs (Bonnefous and Duroselle 1982: 37-38). The 
PCF was criticised by other communist organisations for aligning themselves with extreme right 
parties.  
During this election, the migrant labour issue did not gain much traction in mainstream 
politics. Georges Marchais, the PCF candidate, obtained 15.35% of the vote compared to the winner 
of the first turn Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (28.32%) and the eventual winner Francois Mitterrand 
(25.85%).  Mitterrand beat Giscard d’Estaing at the second round (Conseil Constitutionel 1981). 
Mitterrand portrayed himself as the one to unite the left (and absorbed many of the PCF voters). 
Although he and Giscard d’Estaing campaigned over the reduction of unemployment, neither pushed 
the immigration issue strongly (Bonnefous and Duroselle 1982: 58). This was because the poor faring 
of Marchais, who campaigned against immigration, had demonstrated that the latter could not offer a 
winning edge. 
The Emergence of the FN 
The most prominent French extreme right party, the Front National (FN) emerged in 1972 
and made its first breakthrough during the 1983 municipal elections. It campaigned against the 
admission of migrants and immigration in general. The FN advocates the deportations of illegal 
immigrants and migrants with criminal records or who are unemployed (Shields 2007: 315). The FN 
started to be noticed when it won 16.7% at the municipal election at Dreux in 1983. This result was 
attributed to the people’s disgruntlement with their economic situation which was characterised by 
high rates of unemployment and their resulting feelings of powerlessness (Wadia 1999: 190). The FN 
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capitalized on these sentiments and the rise to prominence of racism against migrant labour which was 
deemed a danger to French cultural identity (Charlot 1986: 37). The FN had an electoral agreement 
with the moderate right Rally for the Republic (RPR). The results garnered by the FN suggest that it 
was successful at making a dent in the electoral results of other mainstream parties on the left by 
scapegoating migrants for the economic precariousness of the French and the erosion of French 
culture. This is in support of my second hypothesis, H2: A government will garner citizens’ support 
for migrant labour policies if it can successfully tackle political actors with extreme right political 
agenda that use issue-framing to scapegoat migrants. 
Importance of FN until Today 
Subscription to the FN is an important indicator of how the French feel about immigration 
and migrant labour policies. Since its breakthrough, the FN has sometimes gained ground while losing 
in other times. It is interesting to examine more closely the relationship between the results garnered 
by the FN after economic downturn in France to find out whether there is a correlation between the 
two. Table F1 gives the details.  
There is no doubt that the precarious economic situation of the late 1970s and early 1980s 
resulted in much support for the FN. However, whether France’s economic situation has resulted in 
more animosity against migrant labour symbolized by the FN gaining votes is rendered ambiguous 
because of the 1988 dip in their electoral results even though the economy was doing well. Otherwise, 
the election results seem to support that the economic situation has helped the FN maintain its results 
over the years. This finding supports H2: A government will garner citizens’ support for migrant 
labour policies if it can successfully tackle political actors with extreme right political agenda which 
use issue-framing to scapegoat migrants, and H3: Support for migrant labour policies will be lower 










FN results Possible Explanation 
Oil shock 1974 NA  
Oil shock 1980 Projection into political centre 
stage with municipal win at 
Dreux in 1983 
As explained in the previous section, it took 
some time for the FN to capitalize on the 
sentiments of the public vis-à-vis their 
economic situation that was not improving. 
These sentiments were given a nationalistic 
slant by the FN. 
None 1988 elections, Le Pen wins 
about 15% during the first round 
of the presidential elections 
There was no economic downturn to boost Le 
Pen’s votes. 
1992-93 Recession Le Pen gains 15% during the 
first round of presidential 
elections in 1995 and during the 
same year the FN wins southern 
town councils of Orange, 
Marignane and Toulon, 
followed by the win of Vitrolles 
at the 1997 by election 
The FN campaigned four issues: national 
preference (against the Single European 
Market which would have seen migrant labour 
moving from poorer European economies to 
richer ones like France(Eurofund 2007), 
security, low taxes and the restoration of 
French culture (de Brie 1998). 
2001 Near Recession Le Pen ranks 2
nd
 at the first 
round of 2002 presidential 
election with about 17% of 
votes. He moved to the second 
round and was beaten by 
Jacques Chirac 
This was a major success for the FN and was a 
real shock for France although it is attributed to 
fragmentation across the political field. 
However they progressed from the 15% 
garnered in 1995  (Dupuy 2002). 
None 2007 presidential elections, Le 
Pen wins less than 11% of the 
votes during the first round. 
The drastic fall in Le Pen’s takings for this 
election is attributed to the ability of Nicolas 
Sarkozy to poach Le Pen’s electorate. I will 
elaborate on this later in this chapter. 
2008 Great Recession Marine Le Pen takes 18% of the 
votes during the first turn of the 
presidential elections in 2012. 
France has not emerged fully from the great 
recession and remains threatened by possible 
economic upsets in the Eurozone. Sarkozy’s 
popularity has also dropped. It could be 
supposed that Marine Le Pen has been able to 
recapture the FN traditional voter segment. 
 
 It should also be noted that the FN prides itself as the preserver of French culture. The 
relatively sustained strong electoral results garnered by the FN over the past few presidential elections 
since 1988 shows that a reason why government policy welcoming migrant labour has received less 
support than it could may be because there is a section of the population that sees migrants as causing 
an erosion of the French culture. Their continued stay or admission may explain why the FN’s results 
are sustained, therefore supporting H1: A government will obtain support from citizens for migrant 
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labour policies when they are not perceived by citizens as affecting their economic interests and 
national identity. 
Effects of Extreme Right Politics on Mainstream Parties 
French mainstream right parties such as the Rally for the Republic (RPR) and the Union for French 
Democracy (UDF) took note of the progress of the FN. They adopted the FN agenda to a certain 
extent in order to try and claw back lost votes. The immigration issue was propelled onto the main 
rhetoric of those parties (Wadia 1999: 191). The left was also affected. In a poll of the PCF and the PS 
(Socialist Party) in 1996, 16% of those polled subscribed to FN views (compared to 46% of the right) 
(Wadia 1999: 191). The total of 62% (which excludes FN’s own members) shows clearly how 
negatively the French felt about immigrants.  
 The political tug of war between the right and the left after the coming to prominence of the 
FN in 1983 demonstrates how the policies affecting migrants became important. However, each side 
of the political spectrum has different views of how to treat the immigration issue. The left advocates 
the dominance of legality
6
 over administrative procedures and therefore prefers the integration of 
immigrants into French society. The right is a proponent of the absolute power of administrative 
structures and procedures and supports the use of the system to deport illegal immigrants and those 
seen as troublemakers (Wadia 1999: 192-194). The rest of this chapter will look at the various migrant 
labour policies in France, compare them and the reactions that the public gave to them. 
Series of Affirmation and Reversals 
Leftist Francois Mitterrand was elected to the presidency in 1984 and his government started to 
reverse the trend of the previous government to deport heavily. The left government introduced a 
number of protective measures against deportation of those who had strong links with France which 
included those who had been in France for more than ten years, minors and spouses of French people 
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48 
 
and those who had met work accidents while working there. Some 150,000 migrants were regularized 
in 1982 (Hayter 2004: 144). 
 These were to be reversed by right-wing interior minister Charles Pacqua under Jacques 
Chirac’s government7. He made entry to France harder with laws passed in 1986. These laws were 
repealed once the socialists took over in 1989 but Pasqua was back in 1993 and introduced a new set 
of anti-immigrant laws. Instead of associating itself with the FN, the right (RPR and UDF) had instead 
borrowed from it and linked migrants to high crime levels, fraud and abuse of the welfare system 
together with cultural decline (Marthaler 2009: 71). This rhetoric garnered enough votes to see the 
right lead the parliament from 1986 to 1988 and then 1993 to 1997. This supports H2: A government 
will garner citizens’ support for migrant labour policies if it can successfully tackle political actors 
with extreme right political agenda that use issue-framing to scapegoat migrants, since the 
government countered the FN by attempting to dip into its pool of voters through adoption of a 
watered down version of the FN’s rhetoric.  
In 1997, ahead of the parliamentary elections Michel Debré, another rightist, introduced laws 
that cancelled the automatic renewal of the ten-year residence permit and brought about other 
measures such as finger printing at work to ensure that migrant workers were legal. Many have argued 
that the crackdown on migrants, of which the Debré law was the last instalment, led to the left 
winning the parliamentary elections in 1997. It should be noted here that there was no economic 
downturn at the time. The GDP growth was picking up (culminating to 3.8% in the second and third 
quarters of 1998) but unemployment was high at about 11% (tradingeconomics.com 2012). Besides 
the high unemployment levels, the loss could be attributed to the right having gone into the 
unacceptable zone by being too extreme in their agenda. This would follow the directional theory of 
voting mentioned in the second chapter.  




 The left had campaigned on more rights for existing migrants including the regularization of 
the sans-papiers
8
 (Hayter 2004: 144). The left (Parti Socialiste) also promised the creation of 700,000 
jobs of which 350,000 would be five-year contracts with the government (Aphatie and Barbier1997). 
This could be a situation of prospective voting whereby the right, which was in power, had not been 
able to improve the economic situation for the French who decided to trust the left or a change 
instead. We can also suppose that the electorate was lured by job creation promises which neutralized 
the effects of migrant labour on the availability of jobs.  This would be in line with H1: A government 
will obtain support from citizens for migrant labour policies when they are not perceived by citizens 
as affecting their economic interests and national identity, which offers that support would be granted 
if citizens do not feel at risk economically. Despite their promises on the immigration issues, once in 
power the left were slow at implementing their wide ranging electoral promises (Hayter 2004: 145). 
This could be because they did not want to upset the electorate by seeming too conciliatory towards 
migrants especially as unemployment only went down in the early 2000s
9
. 
 The victory of the multi-ethnic France team at the football World Cup in 1998 and the split in 
the FN whereby Bruno Mégret left to form his own party are other reasons why the national and 
cultural identity issues brought about by migrant labour policies were cast aside (Marthaler 2009: 72). 
Falling unemployment during the late 1990s also helped. The nationalistic issues would resurface in 
September 2001 after the 9-11 attack. This was coupled with an incident during a football match 
between Algeria and France in 2001 when the French national anthem was booed (Charles and Stehli 
2001). These could have caused the build-up to the success of the FN in 2002 thus supporting H1. 
Sarkozy 
It was mentioned above that a major contributor to the 2002 FN leap in electoral results was the 
fragmented political field. However, the fact that it gathered 17% during the first round of the 
elections also showed that French citizens found the approach by mainstream parties on immigration 
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unsatisfactorily benign. Sarkozy became the interior minister in 2002 and 60% of those polled 
expressed confidence in his ability to handle the immigration issue which involved integration and 
control of illegal immigration (Marthaler 2009: 73).  
The laws introduced by Sarkozy during his two stints as interior minister were aimed at 
regaining voters from supporting the FN by directly addressing their concerns. The first law set the 
minimum quota for deportation of illegal immigrants to 25,000 a year and to reduce the number of 
asylum seekers. These would make way for those who were migrating for the economic benefit of 
France. Sarkozy balanced the hard stance with integrationist approach to existing migrants by for 
example funding mosques and supporting the creation of the French Muslim Council (Marthaler 
2009: 75). Therefore, he attempted to address both the economic and the nationalistic concerns of 
citizens at once. 
 In 2006, Sarkozy introduced the second law which aimed to end illegal migration. He argued 
that unless those who were in France illegally could be deported, France could not be generous in 
accepting deserving migrants. He took a tough stand on marriages of convenience and the abuse of 
state health care and asylum seeking (Marthaler 2009: 75). Sarkozy garnered support for the hard line 
amidst the 2005 riots which arose when two young immigrants were gunned down by the police. He 
blamed it on the lack of integration of the youth in the suburbs
10
 (Jeambar 2005). He commented 
further that in France, immigration is not seen positively because there is a lack of good integration 
policy and it is not linked to the economic needs of France. Foreigners were also admitted as long as 
they could show that they had sufficient financial means to support their family (Marthaler 2009: 75). 
 Sarkozy’s way of addressing the grievances of the population against migrants paid off since 
he won the 2007 presidential elections against Ségolène Royal who adopted a lighter approach to the 
immigration issue. The latter was one of the main issues which included law and order and 
unemployment. The FN under Le Pen also suffered its worst loss in years obtaining less than 10.4% 
of the votes. Sarkozy had found a way to deal with the FN effectively and this contributed to his win 
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thus supporting H2: A government will garner citizens’ support for migrant labour policies if it can 
successfully tackle political actors with extreme right political agenda that use issue-framing to 
scapegoat migrants. Instead of adopting a radical stand to immigration, he selectively dealt with it by 
removing those who were more controversial: illegal immigrants, troublemakers and those who did 
not participate in France’s economic prosperity. He also implemented integration programs to respond 
to the perception that migrants affect the national identity by integrating the migrants and showing 
that the government is taking active steps to do so. These are in support of H1: A government will 
obtain support from citizens for migrant labour policies when they are not perceived by citizens as 
affecting their economic interests and national identity. 
PERCEPTION OF TOO MANY MIGRANTS 
The perception of the French with regards to the number of immigrants can be summarized in the 
following table: 
Table F2 – Percentage agreeing that there are too many immigrants in France11 
Year 1984 1988 1990 1995 1997 2002 2003 2005 2006 2007 
Percentage 58 65 68 73 59 60 59 63 59 56 
 Spikes are in 1995 and 2005 when the FN maintained their proportion of votes and had 
suffered defeat, respectively. Based on this data alone, H4: Citizens’ support for foreign labour 
policies is inversely correlated with the perception of the size of the foreign labour population, cannot 
be supported. However, it is clear that support of the FN and later Sarkozy comes from those who 
believe that there are too many immigrants in France. Table F3 shows the percentage of Le Pen’s 
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 Mathaler 2009: 79 
52 
 




Year 1988 1995 2002 2007 
FN Voters 95 97 97 90 
All Voters 65 74 65 56 
  
In reality, the percentage of foreigners and naturalized French citizens compared to the total 
population has increased to almost two-fold what it was after WWII (Table F4). The absolute number 
of people in these two categories has double during the same period. Those who perceived that there 
were too many migrants in France could have derived the basis for their perception from the fact that 
there has indeed been an increase in foreign-born people in France. However, this chapter has shown 
that unless a political actor links the perception of too many migrants to social or economic qualms, 
chances are that locals would think nothing of it. 
Table F4 – France Demographics 1946-200813 
Population 1946 1954 1962 1968 1975 1982 1990 1999 2008 
Total (‘000) 39,848 42,781 46,459 49,655 52,599 54,296 56,652 58,521 62,135 
French born 
(‘000) 
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After the 1974 recession, the French situation changed drastically from a government-led approach to 
migration to a citizens-influenced system. Governments have to earn the support of the electorate for 
migrant labour policies which contribute to whether the government stays in power or not. The FN 
has proved to be a lasting and defining feature of the French political system. The findings generally 
support the hypotheses posited in Chapter 2. It is noteworthy that besides trying to squash the 
arguments of the extreme right, the government and other mainstream parties can also adopt some of 































Canada is a country of immigrants. There is a distinction between old immigrants who have been in 
Canada for generations and who consider themselves the original Canadians and new migrants. The 
former are mostly from England and France. The latter are those who went to Canada to look for 
work, join their relatives who have already settled in Canada or to seek some form of asylum. Because 
of the high standard of living that Canada enjoys, Canadians can find it hard to accept the necessity to 
have new migrants based on the argument that the latter would contribute to economy. Gripes also 
concern the strain that new ethnic groups (visible minorities) have allegedly put on Canadian society.  
Although immigration to Canada has a long history, to have a meaningful comparison with France, I 
will examine Canadian policies following World War II. 
POST-WWII – 1967  
After WWII, Canada’s immigration policy was guided by Liberal prime minister Mackenzie King’s 
statement that, although Canada should welcome immigrants for economic reasons, they should not 
cause the country’s ethnic composition to be upset (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2006). 14 
Preferred immigrants came from UK and other European countries because, similar to the French 
case, migrants from these countries were thought to be easily assimilated into Canadian Society. 
Asians and Africans were not encouraged. Gradually, the number of European migrants fell and those 
who did come were no longer as educated as before (Li 2003:23). As was highlighted in the case of 
France, this was a time of rebuilding for many European countries that needed their manpower at 
home. This drop in quality led to new provisions in 1962 by the ruling Progressive Conservative
15
 
government under John Diefenbaker. The new policy regulated admission based on qualification, 
                                                          
14
 Mackenzie King was the leader of the Liberal Party of Canada which is in the centre or centre left of the 
political spectrum in Canada. King was the prime minister of Canada for 22 years from 1921 to 1948, with a 
few interruptions during which he was the leader of opposition. He was Canada’s longest serving prime 
minister. He led through half of the Depression and all of the Second World War (Library and Archives 
Canada).  
15
 Progressive Conservative Party of Canada was dissolved in 2003 with most of the members joining the 
Conservative Party of Canada. During its existence, the party took a centre right stance on economic issues and 
after the 1970s, a centrist position on social issues (Wikipedia). 
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education and technical skills (i.e. the ability to contribute to the economy) instead of country of 
origin (i.e. ethnicity) (Marr 1975: 197).  
There was a decline in the human capital despite attracting managerial, technical and highly 
educated immigrants because of the parallel admission of migrants that were not selected (those 
admitted for family reunification and other reasons) (Li 2003: 34). Canada also had to compete with 
the US for skilled labour. From the end of WWII to 1967, there was a net loss of skilled labour from 
Canada to the US. This was due in part to the booming economy in the US and the easy admission of 
migrants from Canada to the US (Li 2003: 24).  
In 1967, a new regulation was enacted, by the Liberals under Lester Pearson, creating a 
universal admission system for those who wished to migrate to Canada irrespective of country of 
origin and ethnic background. The point system, as it is commonly known, was an enhancement to the 
1962 regulation and is credited for the subsequent increase in skilled migrants entering Canada (Marr 
1975: 200). It brought structure and clarity to the admission of migrants. The new regulation also 
removed previously imposed quotas on the number of non-Europeans that could be admitted. Those 
who wished to immigrate to Canada had to pass a points test based on a number of qualities which 
included the knowledge of English and French, and age (Shachar 2006: 171).  
POST-1967 
The changes in the admission basis for immigrants from 1967 onwards led to “visible minorities” 
appearing throughout Canada. These included Africans, Indo-Pakistanis, Chinese, Koreans, Filipinos, 
Arabs, Latin Americans and Japanese to name a few (Li 2003: 33). Debates over immigration policies 
in Canada have been centred on a utilitarian view of how migrants have resulted in benefits for 
existing residents. After 1967, with the emergence of visible minorities, the debates pitting various 
groups at different levels of Canadian society were also coloured with arguments considered racist in 
certain circles. In terms of culture, new migrants were not seen as assets to Canada but rather as costs. 
Canada faced the same problem as France as it saw immigrants congregate in ethnic neighbourhoods 
where they were accused of impacting the heritage and traditional values of Canada by paying little 
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attention to architectural preservation and environmental protection (Li 2003: 130). They were 
accused of taxing the educational system because their children spoke languages other than English 
and French, the two official languages. 
1976 Immigration Act 
The 1976 Immigration Act and its amendments, introduced by the Liberal government under Pierre 
Trudeau, set out the main principles of immigration which included the bolstering of the social and 
cultural fabric, family reunification, facilitation of immigrant adaptation and the strengthening of the 
economy. This new policy grouped migrants into three categories: economic (selected workers, 
business immigrants or investors), family and refugees. Although unintended, many of those who 
arrived for family reunification found work after admission (Richmond 1994: 135).  
Economic Downturns of 1980s  
 At the start and end of the 1980s when Canada experienced economic recessions, the number of 
selected economic migrants was reduced. The country started to predominantly issue one-year 
temporary employment visas to fill short-term needs for domestic helpers, factory workers and 
seasonal agricultural workers.   
The number of entrepreneurs and investors was increased, however. The latter came primarily 
from Hong Kong, with Taiwan, South Korean and the US. Unfortunately, there were abuses in the 
system. Some used it only to gain admission to Canada, for themselves and their relatives, without 
intending to fulfil their investment obligations. The Minister of Employment and Immigration in 1989 
decided to implement a system to monitor and ensure that those admitted fulfilled the criteria of their 
admission (Richmond 1994: 159).  
The family class migrant intake was increased because the strong lobby by ethnic groups 
resulted in the definition of relatives being broadened. In 1991, this was scaled back because those 
migrants were not qualified to participate in the economy. However, on the whole, despite a 
prolonged recession during the 1980s, the Canadian government did not scale back admissions (Table 
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C1). Even though the government tried to manage who it admitted based on Canada’s economic 
needs, like in the French case many came that were not qualified to fill employment gaps.  
At the start of the 1980s recessions, the Liberals were at the helm. When the Progressive 
Conservative party, under Brian Mulroney, came to power in 1984 and befitting of the pessimistic 
economic climate, a commission was called to review government policies to reduce government 
spending. This commission, and another in 1985, recommended increased immigration to grow 
Canada’s economy through a critical mass that should not fall below 30 million (Russo 2008: 296). 
Fewer refugees and those seeking asylum would be admitted. The groups concerned with 
immigration, such as the Canadian Ethnocultural Council
16
 and the Canadian Federation of Labour
17
, 
and employment did not react strongly to the new recommendations (Veugelers 2000: 103-104). The 
Mulroney policy led to a drastic increase in economic migrants from 39% of arrivals between 1981 
and 1985 to 48% by 1990.  
The Progressive Conservatives won another term in 1988 with 43% of the votes, down from 
1984 when they won 50%. The slip was attributed to the Liberals capturing more votes because of 
their anti-Free Trade Agreement stand. Whether or not Canada was to enter a Free Trade Agreement 
(FTA) with the United States eclipsed other issues and the elections were decided largely on that issue 
(LeDuc 1989: 167). This suggests that the public did not find policies that led to large increases in the 
number of migrants admitted unpalatable. This would have led to further punishment of the 
incumbent government given that the FTA was predicted to bring economic ruin to Canada. 
Detractors could have added immigration as further proof that the Progressive Conservatives’ policies 
were not economically beneficial to Canada. Instead, immigration policies were not brought up thus 
signalling that politicians did not see the policies as potentially giving an electoral edge probably 
because the public had accepted them as sound. 
Therefore, hypothesis H1 (a government will obtain support from citizens for migrant labour 
policies when they are not perceived by citizens as affecting their economic interests and national 
                                                          
16
 National umbrella group founded in 1980 by ethnic associations. 
17
 Formed in 1982 to represent labour. 
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identity) is supported to the extent that there was no or very little perception from Canadians that 
migrants being admitted resulted in poorer economic conditions for them. In passing, it is noteworthy 
that many opposed the FTA because they were afraid that once Canada entered into one with the US, 
Canadian national identity would be eroded because of the political influence the US would wield 
over Canada (LeDuc 1989: 165).  The government policies to have temporary migrant labour 
admitted to palliate shortages in certain sectors would not have been seen as economically harmful by 
Canadians. The increased admission of investors would not be subject to protest also since during a 
downturn, they would be welcome to bolster the economy.  
In support of H4 (Citizens’ support for foreign labour policies is inversely correlated with the 
perception of the size of the foreign labour population), Canadians also did not protest the number of 
migrants that were admitted and the reasons could be the same as the ones stated for supporting H1. 
H3 (Support for migrant labour policies will be lower when there is an economic downturn) cannot be 
verified because despite the recession and the increase in the number of migrants admitted as a result 
of the new policy by the Progressive Conservative Government, the latter was not voted out. 
Therefore, it appears that the type of migrant labour is important in obtaining the acquiescence of 
citizens during economic downturn. If there was overwhelming non-support for the current 
government’s migrant labour policy, the opposition should have won given that they had already 
gained based on their FTA stand. This did not happen. 
Further Economic Crisis 
In 1991, Canada faced another recession and unemployment rose. There were also public hearings by 
the Citizens Forum on Canada’s Future18 across the country. Canadians surveyed called for more 
emphasis on “Canadians first”. The conclusion was that while cultural diversity was welcomed, it 
should not be funded by the government or through taxes but rather emanate from voluntary actions 
(Maton 1996). Multicultural policies were seen as divisive instead of resulting in a unified Canada. 
                                                          
18
 The Economic Council of Canada was a federally funded crown corporation which reported directly to the 
Prime Minister. It conducted research on economic factors affecting Canada’s performance, amongst other 
subjects. It was established in 1963 and dissolved in 1993 (Forward undated). 
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While there are doubts that the hearings were representative, they did give an idea that policies over 
admission of migrants to Canada were not being seen in a positive light. Despite this and public polls 
showing that Canadians prefer reduced  immigration when unemployment is high, a report by the 
Economic Council of Canada that same year concluded that immigration had negligible effects on 
employment unless it was brought to very high levels (Russo 2008: 297).  
The Progressive Conservatives were attracted to the electoral base of new immigrant 
populations at the expense of the old support base. This eventually led to the formation of the nativist 
Reform Party
19
, which quickly rose to prominence. The Progressive Conservatives’ decision to press 
on with the immigration policy despite contrary public opinion, their failure to reduce the national 
debt and their introduction of the goods and services tax which was unpopular with Canadians led to 
the Liberals, under Jean Chrétien, winning large swathes of seats during the 1993 elections. The 
Reform Party became the most prominent right wing party displacing the Progressive Conservatives 
(Bowler and Lanoue 1996: 331). 
Reform Party  
The Reform Party cannot be compared directly with the National Front (FN) of France because the 
former is a central right party while the latter is an extreme right party. However, the Reform Party 
preferred the admission of certain types and fewer numbers of migrants whom they argued were more 
beneficial to Canada. This stand made the Reform Party’s position similar to that of the FN. 
After being elected in 1993, the Reform Party pushed for more economic migration especially 
of those who were proficient in one of the two official languages or possessed skills that the economy 
required. Those who did not satisfy these criteria were argued to be a drain on the economy. The 
Reform party was not against asylum seekers and its stand with regards to multiculturalism was not 
uniform. Some party activists and members of parliament stepped out of line and criticised the 
                                                          
19
 The Reform Party was formed in 1967 out of a sense of frustration by western Canadians, especially 
businessmen, who felt that they were not adequately represented. The Reform Party held a conservative stand 
towards many issues such as women’s and homosexuals’ rights, ethnic minorities and more autonomy for 
Quebec. The Reform party made its first breakthrough onto the political center stage during the 1993 Federal 
Elections. It was disbanded in 2000 (Harrison undated). 
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multiculturalist system that Canadian governments had instituted. Reform party won because of their 
populist agenda to which immigration policies fell prey (Russo 2008: 298). Their success showed that 
the right-leaning electorate wanted an alternative of the pre-1993 main right wing party, the 
Progressive Conservatives. The Reform Party’s proposition largely embodied the “Canadians first” 
stand that the 1991 Forum gathered to be what Canadians wanted in immigrations policies.  
The Reform Party’s success supports H1: A government will obtain support from citizens for 
migrant labour policies when they are not perceived by citizens as affecting their economic interests 
and national identity. This is because Canadians voted for a party which they trusted to champion 
policies that would benefit them both economically and in terms of national identity. H3 (Support for 
migrant labour policies will be lower when there is an economic downturn) is also validated since the 
Progressive Conservatives’ drastic loss in popularity is often blamed on their mismanagement of the 
economy which resulted in Canada faring badly as a result of the 1991 crisis (Clarke and Kornberg 
1992: 30). Progressive Conservatives advocated more immigrants as a way to boost economic output. 
The continued liberal admission of economic migrants was successfully linked to unemployment by 
the Reform Party for electoral gain in 1993.  Finally H4 (Citizens’ support for foreign labour policies 
is inversely correlated with the perception of the size of the foreign labour population) can also be 
supported because the “Canadians first” agenda embodied by the Reform Party polled highly because 
Canadians felt that there were too many migrants. 
The Liberals – Changes to the Immigration Act 
The Liberals, led by Jean Chrétien who came to power in 1993, embarked on a review of immigration 
policies which they claimed had become complex and inefficient. Despite promising that the level of 
annual admission would be as high as one percent of the population, the Chrétien government was not 
able to achieve such numbers during its three mandates. At the time it took power in 1993 the 
disapprobation for more immigration policies was at an all-time high due largely to the success of the 
Reform Party in its campaign against immigration (Abu-Laban 2004: 141-142). The Liberal Party 
launched a series of public consultations in 1994 on policies, including those on immigration. 
However, the consultations in respect of the latter have been criticized because of their lack of 
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genuine debate and reception of views contrary to those of the Liberal government (Abu-Laban 2004: 
142). The Liberals also faced opposition from the Reform Party in parliament and could not have free 
reign over the number of immigrants they wished to admit. The new opposition is often credited for 
the Liberal’s subdued approach to immigration policies (Abu-Laban 1998:196). The Reform Party is 
also recognized for the shift from the balanced immigration approach of admitting both for family 
reunification and bolstering the economy to a stand clearly favouring the latter (Black and Hicks 
2008: 246). 
 The Liberals were given another mandate in 1997 and again in 2000. They passed the 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) in 2001. The new law focussed on national security 
and public safety and followed the 9/11 attacks. IRPA was seen as a tool to bring in more skilled 
labour to Canada and deport temporary workers who had overstayed. A series of measures were taken 
against Canada’s economic interest. These included the deportation and scaling back of admission of 
Muslim refugees, many of whom were qualified and skilled. Some of these actions were sometimes 
taken based on faulty intelligence and ran on fears by some Canadians that Islam was equivalent to 
terrorism. To exploit this situation, the Conservatives
20
 authored an interim policy paper in 2004 
reflecting the same fears of not attracting migrants that could integrate well into Canadian society 
(Russo 2008: 300). The situation after 9/11 had been morphed into an opportunity for some parties to 
play on the apprehensions of certain segments of the population through framing in order to gain 
popularity.  
 Stephen Harper and the Conservative Party were elected in 2006 and formed a minority 
government
21
. Harper watered down the more xenophobic arguments of the old Reform Party to gain 
support from the immigrant community. He promised, for example, to create an agency to speed up 
the evaluation of those who sought admission based on their qualifications and to cut down the 
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 This is not to be confounded with the Progressive Conservative Party. The Conservative Party of Canada is a 
merger between the Progressive Conservative Party and the Canadian Alliance (formerly the Reform Party) in 
2003 to form a right wing party. Stephen Harper won leadership of the party in 2004 (Bélanger and Godbout 
2010: 45). 
21
 Stephen Harper and the Conservative Party won the federal elections of 2006 but could not form a majority 




landing fee to half. He gained much support from Quebec which favoured stronger controls on 
immigration. Harper used national security as a base while being careful to distinguish those who 
came to Canada to work hard and contribute from refugees. Harper’s win could be seen as an 
indication that Canadians preferred migrant labour to refugees. There was no economic downturn at 
that time.  
Therefore H1(A government will obtain support from citizens for migrant labour policies 
when they are not perceived by citizens as affecting their economic interests and national identity) is 
supported because Canadians bought into the Conservatives’ claims that their policies were pro-
economy by welcoming a certain type of migrant that could contribute. Similar to Sarkozy, Harper 
had selected certain parts of the migrant community: illegal immigrants for scapegoating and 
deportation thus striking a middle ground. This is in support of H2 (A government will garner 
citizens’ support for migrant labour policies if it can successfully tackle political actors with extreme 
right political agenda that use issue-framing to scapegoat migrants). Harper had toned down former 
hardliner approach to migrants (Reform Party) to garner votes from the locals, including the sizeable 
naturalized immigrant population. H4 (Citizens’ support for foreign labour policies is inversely 
correlated with the perception of the size of the foreign labour population) is also supported because 
the surplus immigrants were portrayed to be those who were in Canada illegally (as opposed to those 
who had been admitted through the legal process).  
 A 2008 incident summarizes the migrant labour climate in Canada. A Canadian newspaper 
printed a letter in which former Progressive Conservative Member of Parliament (MP) Gordon 
Gilchrist argued that most immigrants do not possess any understanding of Canadian history or values 
and should not be allowed to be in Canada. He incited Canadians to lobby their MPs to turn off the 
immigration tap before it was too late (The Peterborough Examiner 2008). He claimed that 
immigrants came to “steal the jobs of Canadians”.   This led to widespread onslaught, especially from 
social activists and immigrant rights groups who accused Gilchrist of being racist and called for him 
to be dismissed as a board member of a public school. This incident shows that civil society is an 
important check against those who, like Gilchrist, try to instil fear in the population and build on 
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existing aversion to immigration to lambast migrants and scapegoat them. H2: A government will 
garner citizens’ support for migrant labour policies if it can successfully tackle political actors with 
extreme right political agenda that use issue-framing to scapegoat migrants, could thus be enriched to 
add civil society as a possible response to those with an extreme right agenda. This is despite the 
proportion of foreign-born amongst Canadians increasing in recent years (Table C1). 
Table C1 – Proportion of Foreign-born among the Canadian Population2223 
 
Population 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2006 
Total (‘000) 14,009 18,238 21,568 24,083 26,678 30,007 31,241 
Canada born 
(‘000) 















































 There has recently been a noted change in the trend of government migrant labour policies. 
Since WWII, most migrant workers coming to Canada were given the opportunity to settle down and 
participate in Canadian society in the long term. There is now an increase in the number of temporary 
workers entering Canada spread across a more diverse array of industries. They have few rights and 
are the guests of their employers. They will unlikely have the opportunity to immigrate permanently. 
This is seen by some as the government having deferred a large part of immigration policy to private 
businessmen since the level of economic immigrants has stayed at a relatively steady level instead of 
these temporary workers adding to the number of economic migrants. As long as these businessmen 
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 Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada - http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/immigration_statistics-




 Note: 2011 official data for foreign born population could not be obtained 
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are able to demonstrate that there are no Canadians to fill the jobs, they can import migrant workers 
(Yalnizyan 2011).  
 The new trend can have serious repercussions on Canadian politics and society. The Canadian 
system has benefitted from the balance between the number of immigrants to help it achieve 
continued prosperity (migrant labour mostly with the ability to immigrate eventually) and that to 
ensure that the national identity is not affected. So far, Canada has been rather successful at finding 
equilibrium and whenever governments have not been able to do so, they have been punished at 
elections. Leaving the private sector to significantly dictate who is admitted, even on a temporary 
basis, could lead to the equation being unbalanced. This could result in the government being blamed 
for a larger than planned visible minority thus impacting electoral performance and admission 
policies. The government runs the risk of losing oversight on the right proportion of migrants with 
various skills being admitted and competing for jobs in sectors where locals usually find employment. 
This would, in turn, create excessive competition and the related issue of depressed wages for locals. 
It could also lead to societal issues as Canadians see more of the visible minorities and not feel at 
ease. This is because although the workers themselves are temporary, they are always seen as being 
present as successive batches of migrant workers come and go. This new situation can be monitored 
for further study. 
CONCLUSION 
The Canadian case differs from the French one to the extent that there is no permanent extreme right 
actor that has a firm grip on a significant portion of the electorate and Canada did not adopt a policy 
of expansion and cultural repression through colonization. Canada has a strong civil society that can 
handle the few who dare to err on the extreme right. The Reform Party that leaned too much on the 
right of the political spectrum did not fare well in the long run and gave way to the Conservative Party 
which featured a more toned down stance. The Reform Party was never as extreme as the FN in 
France and came to prominence in a time when the more mainstream Progressive Conservatives failed 
to respond to Canadians’ aspiration for stability in a time of economic downturn. Once out of that 
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period, the extreme stance of the Reform Party was no longer necessary and it died from irrelevance. 
The lack of an extreme right champion in Canada weakened the extreme right position which became 
less societally tolerated thus making it easier for civil society to drown extreme right attacks. 
The French are still grappling with the miscalculation that importing labour from former 
colonies would result in an easier integration into French society. This has been proved flawed 
because colonization did not result in complete annihilation of certain aspects of the formerly 
colonized migrants’ culture which they did not give up during colonial times and have brought up 
with them to France. The French are fighting the erosion of national identity and seem to still want to 
colonize migrants by imposing French culture on them. Canada adopts the different way of 
recognizing the various cultures of visible minorities and accepting that they make Canada what it is. 
Canadian governments have been able to handle the migrant labour policy better than the 
French as can be seen from the relatively stable political situation. Like the French case, Canadian 
governments have been punished when they did not get the balance between economic prosperity and 
national identity right. The hypotheses in Chapter 2 are verified while H2 takes another dimension in 


















Singapore is largely a city-state of immigrants. It is similar to Canada because most of its citizen 
population consists of early immigrants and their descendants. Otherwise, it departs from both Canada 
and France in that it is a relatively politically closed system. The same party, the People’s Action 
Party (PAP), has been in power and holds on to the majority of seats in parliament since independence 
in 1965. The government has had much leeway in deciding and implementing policies without much 
challenge until recently. 
The descendants of early immigrants consider themselves Singaporean and demarcate 
themselves from others through the fact that they are born and bred in Singapore or, in some cases, 
have served national service. The latter is compulsory for all male Singaporeans and permanent 
residents aged 16 ½ years old (Mindef 2010). Recent years have seen less acceptance for the long-
lasting and often tweaked policy of the government to welcome migrant labour.  
The Singapore government generally attracts two forms of migrant labour: 1) low skill and 
unskilled workers for the construction, manufacturing and service industries and as domestic helpers, 
and 2) skilled and educated workers, dubbed “foreign talents”, who take up white colour jobs. The 
former are transient and have little or no opportunity to immigrate, while the latter can apply for 
permanent residence and citizenship if they fulfil certain criteria such as length of stay and 
contribution to Singapore (Immigration & Checkpoints Authority 2012). 
At various points in time there has been unease over migrant labour policies. The nature of 
the qualms from citizens has gradually morphed and the non-support has increased. This chapter will 
examine why there is opposition to migrant labour policies, how it has affected the political standing 
of the government and how the leadership has dealt with the opposition. I draw some comparisons 






Singapore is a small island state with little resource endowment. The country is heavily dependent on 
trade. Singapore attained self-government in 1959. Previously, it was a British colony before falling 
into the hands of the Japanese during World War II. It reverted to the British after the war. Under the 
British, Singapore was managed as part of the Straits Settlements which included the Malaysian 
peninsula and offshore territories. In 1963, Singapore, Sarawak, Sabah and the Federation of Malaya 
merged to form Malaysia. Singapore was ejected from Malaysia in 1965 following racial unrests. It 
became an independent country the same year (Singh 2007: 19-21).  
 Prior to independence, the economy of Singapore did not see much development. This has 
been attributed to bills enabling economic development being blocked at the central parliament in 
Kuala Lumpur. With its 15 seats in the 127-seat legislature, Singapore leaders’ influence was weak. 
The majority in the central government also pushed for more economic initiatives benefitting the 
Malays thus championing a Malay Malaysia as opposed to a Malaysian Malaysia which the Singapore 
leadership under Lee Kuan Yew promoted (Chew and Chew 1995: 193). The difference in ideology 
eventually contributed to the racial unrest that set the stage for Singapore to be expelled.  
POST-1965  
After independence, Singapore started to develop export-oriented industries which, together with the 
various economic booms around the region and the world, helped to reinvigorate the economy. The 
latter had been in a lacklustre state. The main source of revenue was a dwindling entrepôt sector. 
Singapore also faced various communist-inspired industrial unrests (Low 2002: 96).  
 Singapore recovered from a high unemployment problem by the 1970s and was about to 
emerge from its previous modest economic performance to eventually boast per capita gross domestic 
product matching those of first world countries. Largely through government initiatives, the economy 
had shifted from labour-intensive import substitution economy to a higher skilled and high technology 
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export-oriented one (Kuruvilla 1996: 640). The ability to turn Singapore’s fate around and produce 
consistent economic results cemented the political legitimacy of the PAP (Chan 1985: 147).  
 By the mid-1970s, demand for labour had outstripped supply. For instance, between 1976 and 
1979, 50,000 new jobs were created to be filled by only 30,000 locals. The PAP government relaxed 
immigration laws to allow in more foreigners, at first from the traditional labour source, Malaysia, 
and eventually from Thailand, India and Bangladesh.  In 1979, the government triggered an 
economic restructuring exercise that would result in an upward correction in wages which in turn led 
to lower reliance on foreign labour and would promote the integration of more women into the 
workforce (Hui 1997: 111).  
The First Recession: 1985 
Singapore faced its first post-independence recession in 1985. Despite trying to counter its effects 
with public spending in the construction sector, record numbers of workers, especially in the 
manufacturing sector, lost their jobs. Transient low and unskilled workers were repatriated to lessen 
the impact of job cuts on locals.  
 By 1987, the economy saw an export-led recovery based on mechanization. While certain 
industries, such as construction, required low skilled migrant workers, skilled migrant labour had 
become more desired. Permanent residence had been liberalized in the early 1980s to attract talent to 
Singapore. Strategic overtures were made such as offering 25,000 Hong Kongers permanent residence 
in 1989 in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square incident. This was balanced with wooing of Indian 
engineers and finance executives and a task force was created to attract Malays so that the population 
mix would not be upset by the anticipated influx of Chinese Hong Kongers (Hui 1997:116-117). This 
is comparable to France and Canada which sought to attract migrant labour that matched their existing 
ethnic compositions thus not upsetting the balance that cause the perception of there being too many 
foreigners. The percentage of ethnic representations in the population has been an important aspect of 
Singapore’s drive to maintain racial harmony. 
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The Singapore Government has often argued that importing labour increases the country’s 
economic competitiveness and benefits locals (Wong 1992: 150). While there is scarce information 
about the reaction of locals vis-à-vis foreign labour policies immediately after independence, Low 
reported that a national survey conducted in 1990 over foreign talents
24
 policy showed that 87 per cent 
of those agreeing with the Singapore government’s policies were between 20 and 29 years old and 
had post-secondary education (Low 2002: 112). Low highlighted that older Singaporeans were afraid 
that they would be seen as costly and lacking experience working abroad thus making them prime 
targets for retrenchments. The malaise was deepened by the fact that most foreign talents were more 
technologically advanced than older locals and were therefore more valuable in a knowledge-based 
economy. This finding is in support of hypothesis H1: A government will obtain support from citizens 
for migrant labour policies when they are not perceived by citizens as affecting their economic 
interests and national identity, whereby locals were concerned over their economic wellbeing.  
In the 1997 National Day Rally, then-Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong sought to quell fears 
expressed by some locals that foreigners would change the Singaporean way of life and values. 
Despite encouraging foreign talents to make Singapore their home and calling for residents to 
welcome them, Goh reassured electors that the government would make sure that certain influences 
that foreigners brought would not be permitted in a society that saw itself as conservative (Poon 2003: 
10). This supports the national identity angle of hypothesis H1. In France and Canada, the same 
dynamics were evident from some locals seeing migrants as different and troublemakers. 
Economic Crises of 1998 and 2001 
Despite the Asian Economic Crisis of 1998 when the number of retrenchments and unemployment hit 
record highs, the government continued with its policy to admit foreign labour (Chan and Abdullah 
1999: 181).  It was argued that reducing the number of migrants would result in lower economic 
performance and make matters worse. The government held that the jobs left behind as a result of 
cutting back on foreign labour would be considered undesirable by locals who would not take them 
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 Educated white collar foreign labour 
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up. High technology production sectors also needed more skilled foreign workers than could be found 
locally. Letting go of foreigners would handicap these sectors and result in more loss of jobs (Chan 
and Abdullah 1999: 182). In 1998 the PAP government had a fresh mandate after general elections in 
1997. Therefore, it could adopt bold policies without fear. 
 The economic situation worsened in 2001. This was also an election year and saw much 
debate over the foreign labour policy of the government. The PAP leaders maintained that foreign 
labour boosts economic indicators and used an estimate by the Ministry of Trade and Industry that 
educated foreign labour had contributed to an increase of 2.87 percentage points to GDP growth in the 
1990s (Mui 2002: 370). The government directed those who had been retrenched to various re-
training programmes set up to empower them with skills that would allow them to compete for 
positions. It could be assumed that this rhetoric was enough to appease those who felt threatened by 
the influx of migrant labour since the PAP emerged from the 2001 elections with one of the largest 
margins ever (see table S1). It could be assumed that, given the economic situation, economic 
concerns would be high on the priority list of the electorate, even though it was not the only concern. 
Yet, the PAP performed better than in previous years. The same rhetoric had been used in Canada in 
1984 and 1985 whereby the Progressive Conservative government had called commissions that 
recommended that Canada would need to have a critical mass of certain types of economic migrants 
to sustain economic vibrancy. 
 Similar to the French and Canadian case, throughout the years the entry criteria for migrant 
labour have been shifted upwards. Singapore’s policy has been adapted to ensure that gripes would be 
addressed. For instance, to have a better quality workforce, the Singapore government has constantly 
raised the minimum educational level of low skilled foreign labour. To ensure that migrant workers, 
especially foreign talents, were not competing against local fresh graduates, the government increased 
the minimum salary criterion for the admission of the former from $2,000 to $2,500 in December 
2001 (Mui 2002: 370). These much publicized policy refinements helped to bolster the government’s 
position that it is doing its duty by ascertaining that locals were not adversely affected by the 
continued admission of foreign labour. These policies further ensured that critical segments of the 
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population did not feel economically threatened and were therefore less resentful of the migrant 
labour policies of the government. This supports hypothesis H1: A government will obtain support 
from citizens for migrant labour policies when they are not seen by citizens as affecting their 
economic interests and national identity.  
A GROWING MALAISE 
In recent years there has been a strong voice against migrant labour policies. Some have even 
branded the sentiments of many locals as xenophobia (Jacobs 2012). While the government’s position 
has remained that there is a need for foreign labour to supply manpower to certain industry sectors 
where locals either do not possess the skillset or cannot furnish the staff strength required, the rhetoric 
has been more cautious. It has become more qualified and the government has gone to great lengths to 
explain certain policies and to enact others that curtail the admission of foreigners to work or move 
permanently to Singapore (Hussain 2010). The government has also advertised the measures in what 
can be perceived as an effort to further appease the crowds. 
 In 2006, deputy labour chief Lim Swee Say classified migrant labour in Singapore in three 
categories: the foreign talents who help provide jobs by leading or creating enterprises, the skilled 
professionals that many Singaporeans believe steal their jobs and low or unskilled workers on whom 
Singapore relies too heavily (Chia 2006). He argued that the second category was important because 
they provided the skills that were necessary for the economic growth of Singapore and allow the 
country to compete against other countries which are developing the same sectors and want to tap 
from the same labour pool. For the last group, he stated that they kept wages low in certain sectors. In 
another instance, Manpower Minister Ng Eng Hen qualified Lim Swee Say’s comments and 
mentioned that the government encourages locals to improve their skills so that they would not face 
the issue of low wages that low or unskilled foreign workers cause (Chia 2006). He said that the prime 
consideration for Singapore should be economic growth and welcoming foreign labour has worked in 
helping Singapore achieve that. He noted that businesses appreciated the mixture of low and unskilled 
migrant labour and higher skilled locals.  
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 Both comments were made after the general elections held in May 2006 and indicated clearly 
the stand of the Singapore government: migrant labour was welcome because it helped the economy. 
Importantly, the government also acknowledged the dissatisfaction of the middle class which felt 
threatened by same-skill foreigners who they viewed as competitions. This supports hypothesis H1 
that locals would not support government policies over migrant labour if they feel that those policies 
affect them economically. It should be noted that that both members of the government left out how 
those migrants affect society or national identity. 
 Singaporeans’ view of migrant labour manifested itself in explicit terms in 2008 during the 
‘Foreign workers? Not in my backyard’ saga. The government had announced plans to convert an old 
school in the vicinity of a landed housing
25
 area to a foreign workers dormitory (Sim 2008). This was 
followed by a petition sent to the ministry concerned requesting a reconsideration of the plan over 
worries that the dormitory which would house 1,000 low or unskilled foreign workers would pose 
“security and social problems and spoil the ambience of the estate.” Residents interviewed stated that 
they were afraid that their maids would befriend the foreign workers and bring them to their homes 
when they were not around. There were allusions of the perceived higher crime rates caused by 
foreign workers. Others mentioned that having a foreign workers dormitory nearby would devalue 
their property. Finally, there were the usual concerns of overcrowding of roads and transport services. 
This suggests that while many Singaporeans recognised the need for foreign labour, in this case to 
carry out jobs they were not willing to do, it was also expected to stay out of sight. Foreign workers 
were seen as potential threats to the Singaporean way of life. This supports H4: Citizens’ support for 
foreign labour policies is inversely correlated with the perception of the size of the foreign labour 
population, because seeing more of the foreign workers and being faced with them living in their 
estate gave some Singaporeans the impression that there was too much migrant labour and triggered 
their protest. 
 The mainstream newspaper Straits Times followed up with a survey of locals in other areas to 
gauge their receptiveness to the prospect of having a foreign workers dormitory nearby. Many 
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 Generally for the more affluent and largely restricted to citizens. 
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mentioned that they had no issues as long as the workers did not create trouble, kept to themselves, 
did not make noise and did not display certain behaviours such as over-drinking or walking about in 
their underwear (Arshad 2008). This confirms the earlier observation that unskilled or low skill 
foreign workers are expected to be as inconspicuous as possible so that they would not be noticed and 
not be deemed present at all. There is also a strong sense that locals did not want their national 
identity or their society to be altered by the influx of foreign labour. This is in support of hypothesis 
H1: A government will obtain support from citizens for migrant labour policies when they are not 
perceived by citizens as affecting their economic interests and national identity. The preferred 
invisibility of certain classes of migrant labour is similar to the sentiment seen amongst the French 
whereby the visible “other” is despised and scapegoated for society’s ills. Similar sentiments have 
been seen in Canada although to a lesser extent thus leading to the conclusion that this is an issue that 
cuts across politically and societally different cases. While in the French and Canadian cases, an 
attempt is made at assimilation, the foreign workers in Singapore are temporary and not deemed 
worth assimilating. A logic follows that they should therefore be kept apart from citizens and no one 
questions their lack of conformity to the Singaporean way of life.  
 In 2010, the government amended some migrant labour policies and acknowledged that 
citizens were concerned (Straits Times 2010). A series of measures were announced by the Prime 
Minister, although not to the extent of closing the door on migrant labour. Singapore had barely 
emerged from recession which had large global ramifications. Singapore’s recovery was swift 
(Frangos 2010). The rhetoric was still that foreign labour was required to create more jobs for locals 
(thus appealing to the economic interest of Singaporeans). However, it was also emphasized that 
Singaporeans come first. This was similar to the “Canadians first” stand that the Canadian Reform 
Party thought wise to adopt and reaped much electoral benefit from. The Prime Minister highlighted 
the difference between locals (including permanent residents) and transient labour that would go when 
jobs became scarce. This again appeals to the economic wellbeing of Singaporeans and points out an 
important role of migrant labour: when times were good it was welcome and it helped the economy 
grow; but, it was also the first to be asked to leave when the economy was not doing well so that it 
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would not put a squeeze on scarce jobs. A problem with this economic-centric approach is that social 
concerns seem to be relegated to the background although the Prime Minister stated that time must be 
given to locals to adjust. 
Measures ranging from Workfare
26
 for Singaporeans (Straits Times 2010) and more medical 
subsidy at public hospitals to less tuition fees at various tertiary education institutions (Hussain 2009) 
were announced to make locals feel more privileged compared to permanent residents and foreigners. 
Most of these measures were economic. Various members of the PAP also spoke up to refute the 
claim that foreigners were driving property prices up (Au 2010) or are taking away jobs from locals 
(My Paper 2008).  
 The reassurances from the government did little to ensure the usual successful electoral 
campaign in 2011 when the PAP lost a GRC
27
 for the first time. Some have blamed the growing 
discontent with the migrant labour policy as a strong contributor to the loss (Jacobs 2012). The 
Workers’ Party28 which won the GRC campaigned on the agenda of an alternative voice in parliament 
(The Workers’ Party 2011) and picked up the issue of immigration as part of its manifesto. It also 
fielded a credible team to match the usually qualified and successful individuals fielded by the PAP 
(Teh 2011). Therefore, the results of the Workers’ Party should not be credited solely to the fact that 
they championed policies for fewer economic migrants to be admitted. However, their results and the 
poor percentage of votes garnered by the PAP as well as issues brought up during the electoral 
campaign period (where migrant labour policies figured very significantly) shows that the support for 
migrant labour policy had dwindled. 
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 A scheme to top up the earnings of low-income Singaporeans. 
27
 A Group Representation Constituency is a larger (as compared to a Single Member Constituency (SMC)) 
electoral division both in terms of space and number of voters. The GRC is represented by 3, 4, 5 or 6 members 
with at least one member coming from a minority race such as Indian or Malay. The official reason for the 
formation of GRCs is to ensure that minority races are represented in parliament (Elections Department 
Singapore 2012). 
28
 The Workers’ Party was founded in 1957 by David Marshall, the first Chief Minister of Singapore from 1955-
1956 and a lawyer. The party was inactive from 1962 to 1968 after Marshall left over disagreements with 
Chinese-educated leaders. Since 1968, the party has been active in elections. The original party platform was 
democracy and socialism (Chan 1985: 164-165). 
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Table S1 gives an overview of the PAP’s electoral performance through the years. Despite the 
significant fluctuation in PAP’s performance in the polls, it has occupied the vast majority of the seats 
in parliament since independence. This can be attributed to the first past the post system used in 
Singapore. A proportional representation system would have yielded a different mix. Redrawing of 
constituency boundaries is routinely carried out before every general election (Singh 2007: 172). 
Therefore, gerrymandering can be taken as a constant, although it could have been considered as 
heresthetic. The political situation in Singapore demarcates it starkly from the other two cases where 
governments are voted in and out of power and political actors with extreme, sometimes racist, views 
can operate. It also hints at the level of political freedom in Singapore vis-à-vis France and Canada. 
However, especially in recent years, citizens have been vocal. 








1968 86.7 13.3 Most of the seats were not contested. There were 5 independent 
candidates and 2 parties. Another major party, Barisan Socialis, decided 
to boycott the elections. 
1972 70.4 29.6 6 parties, 2 independent candidates contested. 
1976 74.1 25.9 8 parties, 2 independent candidates contested. 
1980 77.7 22.3 8 parties contested. 
1984 64.8 35.2 9 parties, 2 independent candidates contested. 2 seats were won by the 
opposition. 
1988 63.2 36.8 8 parties, 4 independent candidates contested. 1 seat was won by the 
opposition. 
1991 61 39 Introduction of the Group Representation Constituency. 6 parties, 7 
independent candidates contested. 4 seats won by the opposition. First 
election in which the PAP was led by Goh Chok Tong.  
1997 65 35 6 parties, 2 independent candidates contested. 2 seats were won by the 
opposition. 
2001 75.3 35.7 5 parties, 2 independent candidates contested. 2 seats were won by the 
opposition.  
2006 66.6 33.4 4 parties contested. 2 seats were won by the opposition. PAP was led by 
Lee Kuan Yew’s son Lee Hsien Loong. 
2011 60.1 39.9 7 parties contested. 6 seats were won. First time a GRC was won by the 
opposition. 
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 Source – Elections Department Singapore – www.eld.gov.sg and Singapore Elections – www.singapore-
elections.com. Percentages are based on valid votes. Voting is compulsory in Singapore. 
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There has also been widespread online criticism of the migrant labour policy which many 
deem too liberal. Gripes have ranged from economic disadvantage, overcrowding in general but 
especially on public transport, increase in property prices and loss of national identity. Notable online 
sites such as www.theonlinecitizen.com, www.mrbrownshow.com and www.tremeritus.com as well 
as a large number of blogs have counterbalanced views in the mainstream media which many see as 
being favourable to the government. They critique the migrant labour policy not only on the economic 
front but also from a national identity perspective. Much has been said about the invasion of Mainland 
Chinese which are blamed for altering Singapore’s identity (Jacobs 2012). It should be noted that 
Singapore had already emerged from the global recession in 2011 having posted a GDP growth of 
14.8% for 2010 and 4.9% for 2011 (Singapore Department of Statistics 2012). Therefore, a 
contributing factor to the discontent that came through in the election results may be the perception 
that there are too many foreigners being admitted to work (hypothesis H4) and that they are a threat to 
the national identity (hypothesis H1). Table S2 shows a clear increase in proportion of foreigners in 
Singapore, raising fears from locals that they are becoming a minority in their own country.  The 
population has ballooned throughout the years, probably triggering the sense of overcrowding. The 
government has responded by cutting down the number of permanent residents and new citizens 
admitted and has gone to great lengths to publicise doing so in media outlets (Chan 2010). 
Table S2 – Singapore Demographics 1970-201230 
Population 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2011 2012 
Total (‘000) 2,074.5 2,413.9 3,047.1 4,027.9 5,076.7 5,183.7 5,312.4 
Citizens (‘000) 















Perm. Residents (‘000) 
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 Extracted data. Source: Department of Statistics Singapore 
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Alternative voices which can now be heard through online channels have also had some 
effect, although hard to quantify, on the ability of the government to counter arguments against 
migrant labour policies. Since these voices are highly critical of migrant labour policies, this finding 
supports H2: A government will garner citizens’ support for migrant labour policies if it can 
successfully tackle political actors with extreme right political agenda that use issue-framing to 
scapegoat migrants. In the case of Singapore, the government has not been able to effectively counter 
those political actors who have taken the form of bloggers and other users of online media. Online 
outrage like in the recent case of Ma Chi, a Chinese National, who crashed a Ferrari car into a taxi 
after beating a red light and in the process killing himself, the taxi driver and his passenger, is 
testament of the power of some who use online media to distort such incident into an anti-foreigner 
campaign (AFP News 2012).  
CONCLUSION 
Singapore emerged from a failed union with Malaysia with a strong determination to survive 
economically. It has excelled at doing so and eliminated its early high unemployment woes. 
Singapore now boasts a per capita GDP that matches that of first world countries. The legitimacy of 
the PAP has hinged upon its ability to bring economic wealth to Singapore and Singaporeans. The 
rhetoric justifying and promulgating ever increasing levels of foreign labour is well entrenched in the 
need for migrant labour to maintain economic competitiveness. Policies seeking to ensure that locals 
are not affected by the influx of migrants have sought to demarcate the former from the latter by 
making them feel more economically privileged. The Singapore case shows that citizens would be 
receptive of migrant labour policies when the policies do not hinder their economic wellbeing. 
During the recent years, the views regarding migrant labour have changed. It seems that 
economic gratification, though important, is rapidly becoming insufficient in convincing locals that 
admitting more migrant labour is the preferred way forward. National identity is progressively coming 
to the forefront as locals want to enjoy the benefits of migrant labour while preferring not to be made 
aware of its presence or to have fewer migrants outright. As shown in the “not in my backyard” case 
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and that of Ma Chi, a line of tolerance is making itself more and more visible and crossing it has 
resulted in onslaught by Singaporeans. These are just two cases of many that pop up on online media 
nowadays. The PAP is less able to counter attacks on its migrant labour policies because online media 
have given a channel to those who are aggrieved and has a multiplier effect. Through these means, 
many have complained that there has been too much migrant labour admitted. This has given us 
insight into what exactly people are upset about. The erosion in government support has been seen 
during recent elections. However, the support of the government does not seem to have been affected 

































The United Arab Emirates (UAE) departs from the rest of the cases in four significant ways: 1) the 
government is not popularly elected, 2) the number of migrants is many folds that of locals, 3) all 
migrant labour is transient, no citizenship can be achieved, and 4) dissent has not been and is still not 
tolerated. In this chapter, I will focus on the case of Dubai, one of the seven emirates forming the 
UAE and compare it with Singapore. The choice of Dubai is motivated by how well documented the 
case is. Dubai has also emerged as the most prominent economic and urban powerhouse of the Middle 
East (Pacione 2005:256). Dubai is a repressive system where political liberties are inexistent. 
I do not propose to examine all the emirates because of space limitations that would result in 
the case study being too thinly stretched for meaningful examination. It is challenging to find 
academic writings on migrant labour in the UAE. Most of the literature is in the form of news articles 
and dwells on the abuses migrant workers are subjected to. Information has increased substantially 
during the past few years with the advent of the Internet. However, there is still a dearth of academic 
writing. 
The structure of this chapter differs from the other three case study chapters in that the history 
of migrant labour in Dubai is not a continuous account. This is because there are hardly any studies on 
how the migrant labour situation has evolved throughout the years. Instead, the literature tends to be 
fixated on the rate of growth of the emirate and its quest for gigantism, always competing to have the 
tallest, largest and most unique everything in its real estate landscape. The literature gives the 
impression that it has largely been business as usual since independence: highly educated expatriates 
live a privilege life and unskilled and low-skilled workers are inexistent because they are conveniently 
hidden away and made invisible to visitors who are wowed by the countless man-made marvels that 
welcome them. In this chapter, I will highlight the few reported breakthroughs that migrant labour has 






Dubai was traditionally a fishing and pearling settlement formed by a breakaway group of about 800 
people from Abu Dhabi. They were led by Maktoum bin Buti whose descendants remain the leaders 
today. Dubai did not enjoy much prosperity until the finding of offshore oil in 1966 (Pacione 
2005:256). The massive importation of labour in Dubai started in 1973 when the revenues from oil 
became unprecedentedly high due to a rise in oil prices. Given the low participation of locals in 
economic activities, importation of labour was deemed the only way to progress (Nagi 1986: 47). 
Similar to other cases where the importation of labour was ethnically targeted, the first immigrants 
came from the Arab world. Arabs would move from regions of lower economic prosperity to richer 
parts. 
POST-1971 
The UAE gained independence from Britain in 1971. It was previously known as the Trucial States 
(Mahdavi 2011: 45). It is a federation of seven emirates ruled by hereditary emirs.  The latter retain 
absolute power over their respective emirate but choose one amongst themselves to be president. The 
current president is the Emir of Abu Dhabi, the largest of the emirates.  
 Arabs were the traditional migrants and fuelled the labour needs at the start of the 
construction boom that came with the discovery of oil. However, similar to the other cases, the influx 
from the preferred source of labour slowed down drastically. There are a number of points of view for 
the reason why fewer Arabs came after 1975. First, the Arab source of labour dried up. Second, there 
was still labour but also restrictions on the movement of the workforce which could have come from: 
1) occupational rigidities in Egypt which was the main supplier of labour, 2) ease of obtaining labour 
from elsewhere such as the Indian subcontinent, and 3) concerns amongst labour exporting countries 
on the effect of their workforce leaving (Nagi 1986:49-50). Notwithstanding differences in points of 
view, Dubai and other UAE emirates moved towards obtaining labour from India, Bangladesh, 
Pakistan, The Philippines, Nepal and other countries. The relatively wide range of labour sources may 
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come from two strategies: competitiveness in cost of labour and labour security whereby if one source 
were to stop sending labour for whatever reason, other sources would make up the difference. 
Similar to the Singapore case, the migrant labour population in Dubai can be divided into two 
main groups: white collar expatriates and blue collar low skill or unskilled workers generally hailing 
from South Asia and Philippines working in construction, cleaning and other menial works or as 
domestic helpers. The former group has enjoyed a life of privilege, unrestricted by the rules that apply 
to the local conservative Muslim population and the government has turned a blind eye or outright 
provided the environment that have made these expatriates feel at home (Shadiq 2007). The second 
group has faced an opposite situation living in decrepit conditions, working long hours often in 
dangerous environments and being poorly paid. The minimum wage instituted by a 1980 law has 
always been dodged by employers who routinely withheld the pays of their workers and justified 
doing so as a form of collateral against the latter fleeing (Caplin 2009: 29). This second category of 
migrant workers took on huge debts paid to illegal traffickers in their home countries who promised 
them lucrative jobs in Dubai. Most rationalized a continuation to this trend by arguing that even the 
little earnings they could scrape in Dubai was better than what they could earn at home (DeParle 
2007).  
A third group of migrants is political in nature. Fleeing the new regime of Ayatollah 
Khomeini in 1989, many Iranians sought and gained refuge in Dubai. These Iranians specialized in 
illicit trades such as smuggling of gold, duty unpaid cigarettes and alcohol to Iran or India. They also 
engaged in money laundering (Davis 2006: 56). Dubai’s acceptance of these activities and their 
relationship to sponsoring of terrorism would later result in it being described as a base for terrorism 
funding after the 9/11 attacks on the United States. This has changed since the UAE offered itself as a 
partner in anti-terrorism and a base for spying on Iran (Davis 2006: 57). 
 Dubai, and the UAE in general, depart starkly from the other three cases in that the chances of 
attaining citizenship are almost inexistent. This stand is even harsher than that of Singapore where 
only the highly educated, white collar migrants can apply for permanent residence and may aspire to 
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attaining citizenship (Ali 2011: 554). It does not matter how long someone has spent working in 
Dubai,  he or she would still be a migrant enjoying no more in terms of permanent residence than 
someone who freshly lands in Dubai. Second generation migrants born and raised in Dubai eventually 
have to leave because they are not bestowed citizenship by virtue of their birthplace or where they 
have spent most of their lives (Ali 2011: 557). Therefore, most see Dubai as a temporary place where 
one can gain valuable overseas experience or make as much money as possible before eventually 
having to leave. The inability of migrants to attain citizenship may be a strategy to show citizens and 
migrants alike that the latter are temporary and are not meant to sink roots in and alter the local 
society.  
 Along with the lack of right to citizenship come other rights issues faced by migrant workers. 
In 2006, thousands of migrant workers smashed cars and offices over unpaid salaries. This brought to 
light the long plight of many who toiled long hours in the sun, suffering heat strokes, living in 
decrepit and cramped camps located in the desert away from the public eye, working in dangerous 
conditions with high injury and mortality rates, not being unionized and being at the mercy of their 
employers to whom they are tied for the duration of their employment in Dubai
31
 (Hunt 2011: 24, 
Hindustani Times 2006). Dubai received scathing criticism from Human Rights Watch which 
deplored its exploitation of blue collar workers. This in turn left Dubai scurrying to mend the negative 
image with tourists and investors (DeParle 2007). The government was triggered into reforming some 
of its archaic laws by instituting workers’ welfare initiatives such as the summer sun breaks from 
12:30pm to 3pm in summer and increasing labour inspectors from the then-100 to 1,000 (DeParle 
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 Dubai adopts a system whereby an employee has to be sponsored by a local sponsor. This has led to much 
criticism because the fate of the employee is often determined by how happy the sponsor is with him. This 
relationship has resulted in abuse by sponsors because of their strong power over the employee. 
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A GROWING MALAISE TOO? 
There has never been a popularly elected ruler in the UAE. The only elected body is the Federal 
National Council, an advisory body to the government. Voters are carefully screened (The Economist 
2012). Dissidents are not welcome, especially those who have called for a democracy. They are 
persecuted by the government, forced into exile, deported (even though they have always been 
citizens of the UAE) or jailed (The Economist 2012). These approaches to dissidence have been 
widespread across the UAE, even in Dubai which is considered the least conservative emirate.  Of the 
four cases examined in this thesis, Dubai’s citizens have had the least political freedom. In return for 
avoiding politics, citizens have enjoyed benefits such as generous housing loans, free healthcare, free 
education and a host of other benefits (Shadiq 2007). This approach is very similar to “Canadians 
First” and benefits in Singapore seeking to demarcate citizens from other residents. The use of 
economic and other benefits to appease citizens seems to be commonplace.  It could be speculated 
that the mixture of punishment and benefits has been the cause of the dearth of locally produced 
academic and other literature critical of Dubai. This situation has not changed since independence. 
Despite the heavy-handedness of the government in dealing with dissidence, citizens from 
UAE can and have revolted. Their revolt is enhanced by increasing access to technology (Ulrichsen 
2012). Similar to what was seen in the Singapore case, but maybe not at the same levels, technology 
has given a voice to those who oppose the government thus injecting some freedom of expression into 
an otherwise closed political arena. Petitions have been circulated online and some have asked for 
discussions about government policies through websites and blogs. There have also been calls for the 
Federal National Council to be elected freely and for it to be invested with legislative powers 
(Ulrichsen 2012). An illustration of the emirs’ fears that protest could result in loss of power is their 
severe crackdown on dissent through arrests of 10 Islamists to stamp out the effects of the “Arab 
Spring”32 on their rule (Spiegel Staff 2012).  
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 Arab Spring refers to a revolt by the population of certain Middle Eastern nations against long time despotic 
rulers. It originated in Tunisia in 2011 when a young vegetable peddler immolated himself out of despair against 
the abuse of government officials. The incident triggered widespread anger amongst his compatriots who 
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Since 1973, Dubai has used the petrodollar to diversify its industries. While Dubai achieved 
prosperity, nothing much was known of the cost of its outstanding economic performance. As 
mentioned earlier, citizens are not allowed to protest and are given rewards for not criticizing the 
rulers. Those who have ventured into criticizing the regime have been subjected to various forms of 
repressions. Therefore, how citizens feel about being outnumbered by foreigners is not clear. There is 
no opportunity to vote out the rulers thus excluding the use of electoral results to gauge sentiments of 
the people. On the surface, it seems that locals have no qualms about being outnumbered almost 9:1 
by foreigners in their own country (see Table D1). However, some incidents have offered glimpses on 
the situation beneath the gloss.  
 
Table D1: Dubai Demographics 1975-2010
33
 
Population 1975 1980 1985 1995 2005 2010 
Total  183,187 276,301 370,788 689,420 1,321,453 1,905,476 
Citizens  50,816 62,516 76,692 107,741 137,573       146,028*  
% of Total 28% 23% 21% 16% 10% 8% 
Foreigners  132,371 213,785 294,096 581,679 1,183,880 1,759,448**  
% of Total 72% 77% 79% 84% 90% 92% 
*Estimated based on a 1.2% annual natural increase year-on-year 2009-2010declared in the 2010 Dubai Statistical Yearbook  
** Obtained by subtracting estimated citizens population from total population figures 
  
In an interview given in 2010, the Dubai police chief raised the alarm on how naturalizing the 
migrants would result in Gulf countries (including Dubai) losing their identity (BBC 2010). He said 
that the local population would feel marginalized if the current trend of increasing migrant labour 
influx continued. The irony is that even though expatriates are not naturalized in Dubai, the fact that 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
gathered into an uprising that eventually toppled the government. The revolt spread to other countries with the 
same government toppling effects (Haseeb 2012). 
33
 Data Extracted. Source: United Arab Emirates National Bureau of Statistics - 
http://www.uaestatistics.gov.ae/ReportDetailsEnglish/tabid/121/Default.aspx?ItemId=1869&PTID=104&MenuI
d=1 and Dubai Statistics Center - http://dsc.gov.ae/Publication/SYB_2010.pdf  
88 
 
they are always there in large numbers has some of the same effect as if they were there permanently 
through naturalization.  
Some have pointed out that the relationship between expatriates and locals is one of cultural 
respect of the former for the latter. Crossing the line has led to dire consequences such as in the 2008 
case of a British couple prosecuted for having sex on a Dubai beach (Newling 2008). This is in 
support of H1: A government will obtain support from citizens for migrant labour policies when they 
are not perceived by citizens as affecting their economic interests and national identity, whereby 
national identity is a concern for countries like Dubai where there is an overwhelming number of 
migrants who can potentially change society and the way of life of locals. Actions taken to ensure as 
little impact by foreigners as possible on the local way of life has been seen across cases either in 
terms of assimilation (France and Canada) or deterrent actions in the case of Singapore. The police 
chief’s comments also support H4: Citizens’ support for foreign labour policies is inversely correlated 
with the perception of the size of the foreign labour population, whereby it is felt that there are too 
many migrants in Dubai. These sentiments of too many migrants that affect the culture and overall 
national identity of Dubai have been voiced out by others, such as dissenter Mohammed al-Roken, 
who deplored the invasion of Dubai by expatriates with little regard for conservative Muslim habits 
(Shadid 2007). He decried the government’s laxity towards this and has since been exiled. 
As is expected of Dubai, large amounts of money have been spent on projects to ensure that 
citizens feel special and distinct in treatment from non-nationals. These projects aim to protect the 
heritage, culture, sense of national identity, language, national dress, integrity of family life in a bid to 
preserve ‘Indigenous’ culture (Ticku 2009: 82-83). The hope of the leadership is that despite the 
overwhelming number of foreigners with very diverse cultures, locals will not feel insecure in Dubai. 
It could be seen as Dubai’s way to counter those who are against migrant labour thus to some extent 
validating H2: A government will garner citizens’ support for migrant labour policies if it can 




 The economic part of H1 (A government will obtain support from citizens for migrant labour 
policies when they are not perceived by citizens as affecting their economic interests and national 
identity) and H3 (Support for migrant labour policies will be lower when there is an economic 
downturn) cannot be examined in the case of Dubai because all migrant labour is temporary. In case 
of downturn and if there is a threat to the economic wellbeing of citizens (although that could 
probably not be gauged since there is no means of feedback of citizens to the government), the rulers 
can just close the tap on migrant labour. This was the case during the latest financial crisis when 
record numbers of blue and white collar workers lost their jobs and returned home (Kerr 2008) or, 
sometimes in the case of blue collar workers, are left stranded without food, water and electricity by 
unscrupulous employers who have folded their businesses and disappeared (Hari 2009).  
CONCLUSION 
It is impossible to fathom the true support or lack of support of Dubai citizens with regards to migrant 
labour. Dissidents who voice out against the government are harshly punished. Citizens are kept 
happy with economic benefits from the government. The Arab Spring contagion has not spread to 
Dubai and nowhere can a similar revolution be seen in the emirate. Should we then conclude that the 
rulers have found the right formula to gain support of the locals for a migrant labour population that 
makes up over 90% of the population? Could the population have revolted en masse against the 
liberal migrant labour policy? Or are citizens basking in the prosperity that the economic boom that 
the migrant labour policies have afforded them such that they are oblivious to the quasi-invasion of 
their homeland by foreigners? Until such time and if Dubai citizens revolt or there is a move to 
democracy, answers to these questions cannot be verified. Taking the current situation at face value, it 
appears that the mixture of heavy crackdown on dissent and economic benefits have worked in 
obtaining or coercing citizens’ support of the migrant labour policies in Dubai. 
 Dubai has adopted the same strategy as Singapore to demarcate its citizens from foreigners 
with economic incentives. It has gone a step further by refusing citizenship to migrants even when 
they have been in the country for many years and regardless of how affluent they were. Singapore 
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differs in that it has been welcoming to the affluent and in general, to those who are skilled and 
educated. It has had to scale that down recently because of public opposition. Singapore tolerates 
some dissent and its government is popularly elected although the amount of political freedom is often 
described as low. Locals have to some extent managed to circumvent the political control of the PAP 
government with the widespread use of online media. Dubai does not allow all these and dissenters 
have been meted with drastic actions. It is clear that the level of repression in Dubai is higher than that 
in Singapore, France and Canada. The mix of economic incentive for and tight rein over citizens are 
likely to be the main reasons why Dubai fares better than Singapore in achieving acceptance of its 
migrant labour policies. 
 In the case of Singapore, there seems to be a line of tolerance that cannot be crossed lest 
citizens would erupt in outcry. Dubai has a similar line that is carefully guarded by the government 
instead. It ensures that the freedoms enjoyed by the educated, skilled and often affluent expatriate 
population and the visibility of the low and unskilled labour do not spill into its conservative society 
so that the local way of life would not be significantly altered. It has been more successful with the 
low and unskilled labour who are tucked away in the desert after slogging during the day (same as 
Singapore where this type of labour is housed in remote locations out of sight of the locals) than with 
the expatriates who sometimes cross the line and face punishment. In France and Canada, this group 
of people are visible and tend to form concentrated communities that often become ghettos. The 
presence of the “other” in society has been treated by citizens with suspicion and the perception that 
there are too many of them. This may not be true in the case of Dubai because migrant labour is 
tucked away out of sight. 
 It remains that the percentage of the total population made up of foreigners in Dubai far 
outweighs that in Singapore, France and Canada.  Governments in these countries have been careful 
to maintain a majority  citizen population .  The apparent success of Dubai could therefore be 
attributed to the repression of dissident citizens, the benefits that citizens enjoy and migrants do not 
and the fact that migrants are not visible and therefore the perception of there being too many 













I set out seeking answers to the question: why are migrant labour policies negatively perceived by 
citizens? I have used the case study method on the cases of France, Canada, Singapore and UAE- 
Dubai to test four hypotheses developed after reviewing the literature relevant to this thesis: 
H1: A government will obtain support from citizens for migrant labour policies when they are not 
perceived by citizens as affecting their economic interests and national identity. 
H2: A government will garner citizens’ support for migrant labour policies if it can successfully tackle 
political actors with extreme right political agenda which use issue framing to scapegoat migrants. 
H3: Support for migrant labour policies will be lower when there is an economic downturn. 
H4: Citizens’ support for foreign labour policies is inversely correlated with the perception of the size 
of the foreign labour population. 
 The cases chosen were diverse in their population, geographical location, types of 
government, proportions of migrant labour and historical backgrounds. This diversity enhances the 
value of conclusions drawn across the cases because the resulting theories could be applied to a range 
of similar cases.  
 The case studies support the hypothesis that a government will obtain its citizens support for 
migrant labour policies when these are not seen by citizens as affecting their economic interests and 
national identity. The economic interests can take various forms but usually revolve around the ability 
to earn a living by finding a job. The national identity aspect takes the form of the culture, values and 
way of life of the citizens. Usually, those admitted would need to be present in significant numbers 
and be visible in order to be seen as impacting national identity. Visibility is enhanced by migrants 
refusing to adopt the local mainstream culture and language or forming enclaves by living in the same 
geographical area.  
 The second hypothesis concerned the ability of governments to negate the effect of extreme 
right rhetoric from political actors seeking popular support against migrant labour and migrant labour 
policies. This could be verified at various levels in the cases of France, Canada and Singapore. Dubai 
does not offer much avenue for these political actors to flourish.  
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 Very much related to hypothesis H1 is H3 whereby it is posited that the support for migrant 
labour policies would be lower when there is an economic downturn. There were mixed result in this 
case because some governments such as the PAP government in Singapore managed to convince their 
citizens that migrant labour brings economic prosperity even during times of economic recession. 
However, many have questions this stand and voted accordingly recently. Otherwise, during 
economic downturn, migrant labour was the first to be asked to leave such that citizens’ jobs would 
not be affected. 
 Finally, I sought to show that the perception that there are too many migrants would result in 
opposition to migrant labour policies. Sometimes, perception may not be unfounded like in the cases 
of Singapore and Dubai where the number of migrants has increased very significantly throughout the 
years and reached large proportions. This hypothesis is related to H2 in that gripes may remain such 
unless there are political actors who gather and focus them against the government for electoral gains.  
 Getting migrant labour policies right would therefore mean that governments must ensure that 
admitting more would not result in citizens perceiving that they would end up in an economically 
worse situation and that they would have to compromise on their way of life, collective identity and 
values. With the advent of the Internet that can magnify dissenting voices and the increasing difficulty 
to control it, the government would have to astutely outplay opponents with extreme right agenda. 
When there is an economic downturn, closing the tap of migrant labour and repatriating surplus 
migrant workers seems to work. In order for that to be implementable governments would have to 
ensure that a portion of migrant labour cannot settle down in the host country so that they can be 
dismissed according to the country’s economic performance. The perception of “too many” can be 
tackled by ensuring integration of migrant workers into the host society or ensuring that they are not 
visible to citizens. The common thread running through these ideas is the management of the 
perception of citizens.  
 The suggestions above are harsh because they commoditize labour and pay little attention to 
the humanistic aspects. For instance, repatriating labour when the economy is not performing well has 
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serious downstream effects such as sudden loss of livelihood for workers and their dependents and 
probable indebtedness from unpaid monies borrowed to access the host country to work. Some have 
not had the luxury of repatriation and find themselves stranded in their host countries without income, 
food and basic amenities and with scarcely anyone to turn to for help when employers disappear. On 
the flip side, it seems that a mixture of reward and repression can coerce host country citizens to 
accept migrant labour policies. The use of coercion to force policies on citizens baffles their rights and 
goes against the freedom that most human beings aspire to. 
 The current pessimistic economic situation faced by many developed and developing 
countries, amidst unprecedented ability by individuals to broadcast discontent, has called into 
question the wisdom of governments to participate fully in globalization by admitting migrant labour. 
The rhetoric that migrant labour is essential to ensure or maintain economic prosperity is increasingly 
difficult for many governments to sell to their citizens who face high levels of unemployment. 
Governments in countries that are doing well economically see citizens not being keen to compromise 
on their national identity by supporting policies that admit more migrants that often impact the 
cultural landscape of the local society. Amidst these challenges, the ability of a government to get 
migrant labour policies right not only determines the type of future the country can aspire to but also 
has repercussions on the aspirations of people elsewhere to a better life through migration. 
 The changing landscape calls for more extensive and intensive studies in the current topic 
both by academics, who would then be able to see how the migrant labour aspect of globalization is 
morphing with time, and governments of countries importing migrant labour because of their mandate 
to represent citizens and form policies that benefit them. Governments also need to observe changes 
in expectations of citizens if they want to stay in power. These studies should preferably be carried 
out with first-hand observations within countries concerned. This would ensure that various biases 
inherent in secondary information are dealt with better. 
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